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Western States' response brief contains a hodgepodge of unpersuasive 
assertions that are notable for their inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and 
concessions. The Fullers will reply appropriately. Although the response 
briefing ignores the conditional nature of the Fullers' appeal points, this brief 
will reply to the arguments in the order Western States discusses them. On any 
or all grounds, this Court should reverse and remand for entry of an amended 
judgment using the legally correct interest rate. 
I. THE LEGAL RATE FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST OF 10% 
APPLIES TO THE TORT CLAIMS IN THIS CASE. 
Western States suggests the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
rejecting the legal rate in Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) (2013). (Aplee. Br. at 7.) 
Abuse of discretion is not the proper standard of review if the Court reaches this 
issue. Rather, the proper rate to apply is a legal question reviewed for 
correctness. See Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App 119,, 21,350 P.3d 615. 
A. The Plain-Language Construction of the Statute Applies the Legal 
Rate to "Any" Cause of Action, Not Only Those That Are the 
Subject of a Contract. 
The parties are in agreement that Section 15-1-1(2) should be construed 
according to its plain language. Western States' proffered construction, 
however, eschews plain language in favor of limiting language that does not 
appear within the governing provision. While the legal rate in subsection (2) on 
its face applies to any chose in action, Western States reads it to apply only to 
choses in action that are the subject of a contract. 
Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 15-1-1 provide: 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is 
the subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, 
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, 
goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
These two subsections address different but related concepts. Subsection 
(1) provides that parties may enter into a contract agreeing to an interest rate 
between themselves for the loan or forbearance of any 1noney, goods, or choses 
in action addressed in their contract. Subsection (2), in contrast, provides that 
unless there is a contract to the contrary, the legal rate will be 10% for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or choses in action. Only by lifting language 
out of subsection (1) and imposing it upon subsection (2) can Western States' 
proffered consh4 uction be realized. This would do violence to the statute, 
however, as the Legislature is presumed to choose its wording advisedly. See 
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50,114,267 P.3d 863. 
Here is how Western States would have subsection (2) read: 
Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the 
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action [that is the subject of their contract] shall be 10% per 
annum. 
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The fact the underlined words appear in subsection (1) but not subsection (2) is 
a distinction with a difference, as the language of subsection (1) is conclusive 
evidence that the Legislature knew how to use such limiting language if that 
was the result it intended. See Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50,114 (appellate courts 
"seek to give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all 
omissions to be purposeful"). Moreover, Western States' reading of the statute, 
implying a phrase that is expressly omitted, is not a natural or persuasive 
construction. See Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, 1 17, 133 P.3d 428 ( only 
plausible, reasonable readings need be considered). 
Western States' reading of subsection (2) is that "[i]t only governs 
contracts addressing loans, forebearance [sic], or chose [sic] in action." (Aplee. 
Br. at 9.) Western States suggests an example of a contract addressing a chose in 
action is found in Time Finance Corp. v. Johnson Trucking Co., 458 P.2d 873 (Utah 
1969). That case involved an assignment of a claim from one entity to another. 
Western States does not explain how interest could ever accrue on such a 
contract. Moreover, Western States' description of the Time Finance assignment 
as a "chose in action which is the subject of a contract" (Aplee. Br. at 9) partakes 
of the very nature of its own criticism: it ignores the statutory link to the word 
"forbearance" and adds words not actually found in subsection (2). 
The Fullers' approach- which is the one sanctioned by long usage in the 
courts - better implements the plain language of subsection (2). A "chose in 
3 
action" is "[a] proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owed by another 
person, a share in a joint-stock company, or a claim for damages in tort." Black's 
Law Dictionary 294 (10th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). It is synonymous with 
"thing in action," which is the term used in the Utah statutes until 1985. See id.; 
Addend. Ex. 9, at 16.1 
"Forbearance" means" [t]he act of tolerating or abstaining," or "[t]he act 
of refraining from enforcing a right, obligation, or debt." Black's Law Dictionary 
760 (10th ed. 2009). It is "a refraining from the enforcement of something (as a 
debt, right, or obligation) that is due" or "the act of forbearing: patience." 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ forbearance. 
What, then, is "forbearance" of" any ... chose in action" or, for that 
matter, of" money"? It is this case: the Fullers did not receive money to which 
they were entitled, because of the defendants' wrongful conduct, and so sued in 
tort to recover it. The Fullers' judgment on their chose in action, received eight 
years after the money should have been paid, was the very type of 
"forbearance" contemplated by the statute, as recognized by case law from both 
the Supreme Court and this Court. See, e.g., Iron Head Constr. Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 
UT 25, ,I 10,207 P.3d 1231 ("[A]n award of prejudgment interest simply serves 
to compensate a party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time 
'The word "chose," as used here, derives from the French and means "[a] thing, 







and, as a corollary, deters parties from intentionally withholding an amount that 
is liquidated and owing.") (quotations and citation omitted); Kraatz v. Heritage 
Imps., 2003 UT App 201, ,r 75, 71 P.3d 188 ("Plaintiffs are entitled to damages for 
the loss of use of the money that, but for the [defendant]'s breach and ensuing 
delay, would have been paid to plaintiffs in satisfaction of their ... claim."); 
Sundial Inc. v. Villages at Wolf Hollow Condo. Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 2013 UT 
App 223, ,r 8, 310 P.3d 1233 (reading statute to apply legal rate to recovery on a 
non-contract cause of action). 
Lastly, if Western States' reading were to be adopted by this Court, the 
judgment should still be reversed and an amended judgment entered in favor of 
the Fullers on this record. Under Western States' reading, subsection (2) 
provides a 10% legal rate for interest when parties have contracted with respect 
to a chose in action but have not specified an interest rate. Here, the district 
court concluded that the parties stipulated to an award of prejudgment interest 
for the Fullers' breach of agency duty and negligent misrepresentation claims 
against Western States. (R. 1973, at 12.) That stipulation constitutes a valid 
contract. According to Western States, the parties' contract did not include an 
agreement on the rate. Therefore, under Western States' proffered reading of the 
statute, the Court is required to impose a 10% rate because a chose in action was 
the "subject of their contract." 
The plain-language reading of Section 15-1-1(2) favors the Fullers. 
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B. The Statutory HistQry of Section 15-1-1(2) Supports the Continued 
Reading of the Statute to Follow the Rule from Fell and Uinta 
Pipeline in Tort Cases. 
There is no principled distinction to be made between the historical 
versions of the prejudgment interest statute. The Fullers submitted the statutes 
from 1898 to the present so the Court could see the continual thread of statutory 
law that matches the continual thread of case law during that same period. 
(Addend. Ex. 9.) Except for the Wilcox/Consolidated Coal language discussed in 
this appellate briefing, Utah case law has consistently read these statutes the 
same way. That is because they are substantively the same. 
Like the current statute, the 1898 version at issue in Fell v. Union Pac. RR, 
88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907), had separate portions dealing with interest- one focused 
on the interest rate for all claims, another dealing with the interest rates for 
contracts: 
[1] It shall be lawful to take eight per cent interest per annum, when the 
amount of interest has not been specified or agreed upon. [2] [a] But 
parties may agree in writing for the payment of any rate of interest 
whatever, on money due or to become due on any contract. [b] Any 
judgment rendered on such contract shall conform thereto, and shall bear 
the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the 
judgment. 
Revised Statutes § 1241 (1898) (bracketed numbers and letters inserted). 
The first sentence, marked "[1 ]" herein, allowed for agreements on 
interest rates for claims but made the legal rate the default rate in the absence of 
such an agreement. It is this sentence that Fell applied and that corresponds to 
6 
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the current Section 15-1-1(2). See, 88 P. at 1007. The second sentence of Section 
1241, marked "[2][a]" herein, dealt specifically with money due on contracts, 
allowing the parties to provide their own contract rate. This sentence was not at 
issue in Fell (which was a tort case) but corresponds to the current Section 15-1-
1(1). The third sentence, marked "[2][b]," provides that the final judgment in a 
contract case will bear the interest rate of the contract. This corresponds to the 
current Section 15-1-4(2)(a), providing that the parties' agreement on an interest 
rate supplies the prejudgment and post-judgment interest rate in contract 
actions. See Utah Code Ann.§ 15-l-4(2)(a) (" ... [A] judgment rendered on a 
lawful contract shall conform to the contract and shall bear the interest agreed 
upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment."). 
The current statute demarcates these concepts more brightly than the 1898 
statute by separating the concepts into different provisions rather than running 
them together one after the other. But the provisions are all there just the same. 
There is no material change to any of the relevant statutory provisions 
enacted by the Legislature from 1898 to the present, as Western States suggests. 
(Aplee. Br. at 2, 13-14.) The Supreme Court held the 1898 statute "allow[s] 
interest in all cases at the legal rate, in the absence of an agreement." Fell, 88 P. at 
1007; see also id. at 1006 ( distinguishing cases in which prejudgment interest is 
unavailable). This is no different from subsection (2) of the current statute, 
7 
which provides the interest rate for prejudgment interest in the absence of an 
agreement. 
The subsequent changes to the statute have refined the language but 
retained the central meaning all the way through to the present: the statute 
provides the legal rate unless the parties agree by contract to a different rate. 
This is evidenced further by consistent application of the Fell rule in case law 
from the time Fell was decided to the present, despite variations in the statutory 
language. (See Aplt. Br. at 30-34, collecting cases.) It is not until Justice 
Zimmerman engaged in his unbriefed ruminations that this consistent 
application veered in a different direction. 
The Western States defendants suggest the word II contract" or the concept 
of an agreed rate did not appear in any version of the statutes from the time of 
the Fell decision in 1907 until 1989, a date they say marked some sort of 
watershed moment when the Legislature acted to implement the idea. (Aplee. 
Br. at 18.) This is simply not true. The statute at issue in Fell specifically 
provided that parties could II agree" to a different rate of interest. Revised 
Statutes § 1241 (1898), Addend. Ex. 9, at 1-2. When the statute was amended in 
1907, breaking one provision into several, the language providing for a 
11 contract" the parties might make for a different rate of interest was moved to a 
new Section 124lx. (Supplemental Addendum Ex. 10, at 3, attached hereto.) This 
11 contract" wording and concept carried forward in all future versions, as a 
8 
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separate provision akin to the 1907 version of Section 1241x and as a separate 
provision akin to the third sentence of the 1898 Revised Statutes§ 1241, marked 
as "[2][b ]" in the discussion above, calling for any agreed contract rate to be 
included as the prejudgment and post-judgment rate in the final judgment. 
(Suppl. Addend. Ex. 10; Addend. Ex. 9, at 5-18.) 
There is a difference through the years in legislative form and style, not in 
substance, and the case law interpreting the statutes remains constant in 
adhering to the Fell construction throughout these various iterations of the 
statute. The present statute continues to read this way as well, as Western States 
acknowledges when it points out that"§ 15-1-4 specifies that cont[r]acting 
parties may set their own interest rates, and that such rates will apply to 
prejudgment interest." Aplee. Br. at 22. 
The 1989 statute did not add in a new concept that had never been in the 
statutes before. Rather, it continued the rate-by-agreement exception to the legal 
rate, but returned the form to more closely approximate that in the 1898 statute 
at issue in Fell, discussing the legal rate alongside the contractual exception. In 
fact, the form of the present statute is closer to what it was in Fell than in any 
other version. 
It is this sort of history and analysis that Justice Zimmerman glossed over 
in unilaterally pronouncing his gratuitous dicta. This is the very reason why 
dicta is unreliable, indulged as it is without briefing. The Wilcox Court 
9 
unwittingly perpetuated the problem when it glommed on to such dicta and 
treated it broadly as law, albeit in a limited arena that does not govern here and 
that can be fully justified on separate statutory grounds. See Wilcox v. Anchor 
Wate, 2007 UT 39, ,r,r 44-48, 164 P.3d 353. The ipse dixit statements made by the 
Western States defendants about purported statutory history and intent partake 
of the same nature. They are untrustworthy and do not accurately reflect the 
continual history of Fell and its progeny, and the statutes they interpret, for 
more than 100 years.2 
Case law post-1989 reads the statute the same way as case law pre-1989. 
(See Aplt. Br. at 30-34.) In fact, 1989 is not even correctly identified as the year 
the statute moved back toward its present form; 1985 is. (Addend. Ex. 9, at 15-
16.) Thus, Western States' argument that Consolidation Coal was only the second 
case to discuss a relevant version of the statute misses the mark. (Aplee. Br. at 
18. )3 But even if it were, the divergent opinions in Consolidation Coal highlight 
2 In a later decision that did not touch on prejudgment interest, the Supreme 
Court emphasized II the unique nature of the claims" in Wilcox, noting that its 
articulation of the rule on unjust enrichment derived from II the unique 
considerations present in a preferential transfer case." Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2010 
UT 52, ,r 47 n.62, 240 P.3d 754. The same can be said for the Supreme Court's 
prejudgment interest discussion in that same case. See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, ,r 43 
("The question presented by Anchor Wate' s challenge to the interest rate is 
whether the 10% default rate specified by section 15-1-1(2) is applicable to the 
Liquidator's judgment obtained pursuant to the voidable preference provisions 
of the Liquidation Act."). 
3 The purported one other case, Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992), later 





the problem being addressed now: Justice Zimmerman made an off-the-cuff 
observation, while Judge Bench, sitting by designation, assiduously studied the 
case law and statutory history and followed decades of precedent-in his analysis 
- including citing numerous cases applying the post-1985 form of the statute . 
Compare Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 
514,525 n.13 (Utah 1994) (Zimmerman individualized dicta), with id. at 528-29 
(Bench, J., concurring and dissenting) (surveying case law), abrogated on other 
grounds by State ex rel. Sch. & Institutional Trust Land Admin. v. Mathis, 2009 UT 
85, 223 P.3d 1119. 
A correct reading of the statute's history confirms the correct result here. 
C. Western States' Case Law Discussion Is Wholly Unpersuasive. 
Like its statutory argument, Western States' case law discussion is full of 
sound and fury but does not accurately characterize the jurisprudence it 
invokes. 
claim on which prejudgment interest could be awarded, apparently seeking 
only a declaratory judgment against his insurer as to insurance policy limits. 
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1. Wilcox has not been followed by this Court, let alone with 
respect to common law tort claims. 
Despite the Western States defendants' assertion, they make no showing 
that this Court "has followed Wilcox," let alone with respect to tort claims. 
(Aplee. Br. at 7.) The cases Western States cite for this proposition do not 
support such a contention. 
This Court's decision in Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 
2015 UT App 173,355 P.3d 1047, reh'g denied (Sept. 8, 2015), does not cite or 
discuss Wilcox and is unhelpful to Western States here. The trial court awarded 
the plaintiff prejudgment interest of 10% pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-
1(2) for overpayment of municipal service fees. Id. ,r,r 3-9, 27-31. The Court held 
the service fees in question were contractual in nature, but did not discuss the 
operation of the prejudgment interest statute except to note in passing that it 
11 sets a default interest rate for most confracts at 10% per year." Id. ,r,r 30, 31. It 
did not discuss the application of the statute to tort claims. 
Western States also cites to Francis v. National DME, which is already fully 
addressed in the Fullers' opening brief. (Aplt. Br. at 41-43.) National DME 
specifically declined to decide whether Wilcox applied because the issue was 
inadequately briefed. 
Neither of the cases Western States cites can be accurately said to have 





broad and unsupported proposition. The Court would undoubtedly be required 
to follow Wilcox in any case where it applies; but that begs the very question 
now before the Court, as Wilcox was not a common law tort case. 
The Fullers did not themselves propose the statutory construction they 
now urge; rather, the Fullers are relying on many decades of statutory 
interpretation and case law handed down by Utah's appellate courts. That case 
law overwhelmingly forms the basis for the Fullers' position that Section 15-1-
1(2) "set[s] the legal interest rate at 10% per annum or, alternatively, any rate 
agreed upon by the parties." Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 1 26, 82 
P.3d 1064 (affirming modified jury award of prejudgment interest). 
2. Non-controlling federal court cases are unpersuasive. 
Without responding particularly to the Fullers' appeal points, Western 
States has essentially cut and paste from the district court briefing its argument 
invoking unpublished federal cases. (Aplee. Br. at 20-21; cf R. 1808.) Western 
States again refers erroneously to these singular decisions applying federal law 
as "Utah case law." (Aplee. Br. at 20.) The Fullers fully addressed these cases 
and Western States' argument in their opening brief. (Aplt. Br. at 46-49.) 
Western States' single new citation to Caldwell v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 287 
F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2002), highlights the distinction between jurisprudence 
in the federal courts and in the Utah state courts. (Aplee. Br. at 22.) The Tenth 
Circuit noted "[m]any circuits have held that courts are not required to use [28 
13 
U.S.C.] section 1961 in calculating prejudgment interest and that the calculation 
rests firmly within the sound discretion of the h·ial court. We now join them." Id. 
(citations omitted). That is simply not the law of this state. 
3. Peterson v. Jackson is off point. 
The Fullers pointed out in their opening brief that Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 
UT App 113,253 P.3d 1096, cited by Western States below (R. 1809), is unhelpful 
in this analysis. (Aplt. Br. at 49-50.) The statute in Peterson specifically gave the 
courts equitable discretion to determine the interest rate to be employed in the 
statutory dissolution of a privately held corporation. See Utah Code Ann. § 16-
l0a-1434. Because no such statute exists here, Peterson is off point. Western 
States intones a tepid argument based on Peterson (Aplee. Br. at 21-22), but it 
falls flat as having no persuasive force whatsoever in the present context. 
In sum, the statutory construction argument favors the Fullers' position. It 
is the analysis the Utah appellate courts have employed since 1907. Wilcox does 
not call for a different application here, in this common law tort case. The Court 
should so hold as a matter of law if it reaches this point in the analysis. 
II. THE PARTIES' STIPULATION TO USE A 10% PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST RATE SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
As noted in the Fullers' opening brief, the threshold question is whether 
the parties stipulated to use a 10% prejudgment interest rate. That question 
14 
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should be decided in the affirmative. If it is, the Court need not even reach the 
statutory analysis. 
A. The Parties Stipulated to the Rate in Jury Instruction No. 29 and 
Never Agreed to Have the District Court Decide a Different Rate. 
There is no dispute that the parties stipulated to Jury Instruction No. 29 
and the district court approved it. (R. 1631; 1969, at 68, 70, 1702.) It identified the 
agreed prejudgment interest rate as 10%. (R. 1631.) Given its argument, Western 
States has some responsibility to show where in the record the parties 
purportedly discussed allowing the judge to determine a different rate. This 
cannot be shown because it was not done. 
The first time a different suggestion was made was after the verdict. (R. 
1763-65.) Using terminology that had never been discussed as part of the 
stipulation, Western States suggested that the parties had merely "agreed that 
prejudgment interest was 'in play."' (R. 1763.) While the district court initially 
accepted this premise before correcting course (R. 1795-96; 1973, at 1-12), the 
fallout from this fallacious position included the stipulation on rate being lost in 
the wreckage. 
This Court uses a plain-language approach to the parties' stipulation, 
though it may consider any relevant evidence in determining whether the 
parties' expressed intent was ambiguous. See, e.g., State ex rel. H.S. v. State, 2013 
UT App 239, ,r 11,314 P.3d 1005; Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div'n of Utah State Tax 
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Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, ,r,r 39-40, 20 P.3d 287. Western States' after-the-fact 
explanation is irrelevant in determining intent, as intent may only be measured 
at the time of entering into the stipulation. See Yeargin, Inc., 2001 UT 11, ,r,i 39-
44. This Court may interpret the intentions of the parties as a matter of law 
through the language chosen to articulate the agreement. See id.; Peterson v. 
Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ,r 18, 48 P.3d 918. 
The colloquy articulating the stipulation is marked by the usual hems, 
haws, and unrecorded head nods common to an oral colloquy, but the language 
to which the parties agreed is manifest by the record: the jury instruction would 
be withdrawn and the judge would make the determination using the agreed 
10% rate if the jury awarded property damages to the Fullers: 
THE COURT: Well, are you - is there any argument about whether -
MR. BARRETT: No -
THE COURT: -- they're entitled to prejudgment interest? 
MR. BARRETT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BARRETT: If there's a property damage -
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. 
MR. BARRETT: - there's going to be prejudgment interest -
16 
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THE COURT: ... I don't see that there's a disagreement about 
whether they're entitled to it or not. ... 
THE COURT: ... [I]t's a simple calculation, so I really didn't care 
much, because it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in your head. 
I also don't think as I said, there's any - it's - the amount is fine .... 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury instruction 29 is withdrawn. 
(R. 1969, at 71-73.) 
Western States has asserted every variation of what the stipulation might 
mean, other than the real one. Western States opposed any award of 
prejudgment interest on grounds there was no stipulation reached on prejudgment 
interest, but only that prejudgment interest would somehow be "in play" for the 
judge to determine starting afresh. (R. 1763-65; R. 1973, at 3-5.) Later, Western 
States was forced to concede that interest being "in play" is only the phrase it 
"intended to use" (R. 1973, at 4) and that it "would hope the record would've 
reflected a reservation to make argument." (R. 1973, at 5.) When this idea failed, 
Western States argued that it intended to stipulate to prejudgment interest on 
contract damages but not tort damages. (R. 1973, at 3-12.) This, too, failed. (R. 1973, 
at 12.) Western States now takes the position that it stipulated only to the award 
of prejudgment interest but not the rate or date. (Aplee. Br. at 31.) This Court can 
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have no confidence in an asserted meaning given to the stipulation that changes 
based on the perceived needs of the moment. 
Western States also argues the scope of the stipulation is what is at issue 
and not the fact of the stipulation, and that therefore the intent of the parties is a 
factual question. (Aplee. Br. at 24-25, 31 n.18.) That is wrong on this record. The 
stipulation is fairly articulated on the record such that this Court can determine 
the parties' intent as a matter of law. "Often, the interpretation of the terms of a 
contract ... presents a question of law that, as a general matter, may be as 
readily resolved by an appellate court as by the district court." Hemingway v. 
Construction by Design Corp., 2015 UT App 10, ,r 17,342 P.3d 1135 (citing 
Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996) (noting that" appellate courts 
are in as good a position as trial courts to interpret [legal issues such as] court 
rulings")). That is the case here. 
If the Court nevertheless considers the suggestion, clear error was 
demonstrated in spades in the Fullers' opening brief and again here in reply to 
the newly proffered standard of review. The 10% stipulation was made in the 
agreed and approved jury instruction; that portion of the previously settled 
stipulation was never "undone"; and the 10% standard was specifically 
articulated by the court when the parties' stipulation replaced the instruction. 
(R. 1631; 1969, at 69-73.) In revisiting the question after the verdict, the district 
court did not review the portion of the h·anscript reciting the agreed rate as part 
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of the stipulated instruction withdrawal, overlooking it altogether 
notwithstanding the vigorous arguments of the Fullers below. (R. 1745-46, 1775-
80; 1973 at 6-12.) The district court's failure to enforce the stated intentions of the 
parties, which the district court itself had previously articulated on the record, is 
clearly erroneous if this is the proper standard to apply. 
Western States argues repeatedly that there was no stipulation reached on 
rate or date because a different date was subsequently agreed to by the Fullers. 
(Aplee. Br., passim.) This finds no support in the record. The parties stipulated to 
the date just as they did the rate. (R. 1631.) Consistent with their stipulation, the 
Fullers submitted for entry their judgment reflecting prejudgment interest 
beginning on the stipulated date. (R. 1742-51.) The district court nevertheless 
ruled that no stipulation had been reached of any kind on prejudgment interest, 
required additional briefing on all prejudgment interest issues, and held a 
hearing to determine the starting date for prejudgment interest. (R. 1795-96.) At 
that juncture, though the Fullers had an appeal point, the district court's 
decision was the law of the case. See IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 
2008 UT 73, ,r 26, 196 P.3d 588 (" [U]nder the law of the case doctrine, a decision 
made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of 
the same litigation.") (quotations and citation omitted). 
During the course of the hearing that ensued, the Fullers agreed on the 
record to a new starting date that was four months after the originally stipulated 
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date - the date of denial of their insurance claim rather than the date of the fire -
and they do not challenge that ruling on appeal. (R. 1973, at 12-13.) This does 
not mean that no stipulation was originally reached on date. To the contrary, the 
Fullers simply chose to resolve that issue on a reasonable basis - four months' 
difference in time being not worth the effort, and the district court's reasoning a 
satisfactory enough basis for doing so - in an attempt to find closure to long-
running litigation issues and to focus on the more important rate issue. (R. 1973, 
at 2, 13.) When the district court failed to properly apply the law on the single 
issue left for decision, however, the Fullers sought appellate review. This is a 
prime example of proper litigation conduct consistent with appellate courts' 
direction that district court proceedings should decide as many issues as they 
can, so as to focus issues for appeal. See, e.g., Hemingway v. Construction by 
Design Corp., 2015 UT App 10, il 17,342 P.3d 1135 (citing judicial economy as 
grounds for remanding for further district court proceedings). It is simply not 
true that the start date for the accrual of interest was "indisputably reserved to 
the district court." (Aplee. Br. at 31.) 
Western States now argues the judge's approval of the 10% rate at the 
time of the stipulation is somehow ambiguous and could be referring to any 
number of things besides the rate. Here is a quote of the statements Western 
States now finds ambiguous: 
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THE COURT: ... [I]t' s a simple calculation, so I really didn't care much, 
because it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in your head. I also 
don't think as I said, there's any - it's - the amount is fine .... 
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury instruction 29 is withdrawn. 
(R. 1969, at 73, emphasis added.) No reasonable argument can be made in this 
context that the district judge was somehow merely condoning the application 
of interest" to property damages, but not to rent damages," or simply approving 
"the final layout of the Special Verdict form." (Aplee. Br. at 28.) Nor is there 
support for the conclusion that the parties were talking solely about pending 
contract claims but excluding tort claims. (Aplee. Br. at 29.) 
The district court's decision letting Western States out of its stipulation 
was an abuse of discretion that resulted in significant harm to the Fullers. That 
decision should be reversed and judgment given to the Fullers with 
prejudgment interest at a 10% rate. 
B. The Stipulated 10% Prejudgment Interest Rate Reflected the 
Parties' Agreed Rate as Well as the Law. 
Western States suggests there was no error in ignoring the stipulation 
because 10% was not the governing legal rate and courts are not bound by 
stipulations of law or stipulations that reflect erroneous statements of the law. 
(Aplee. Br. at 32-33.) These arguments do not advance the ball here. 
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The 10% rate stipulated to in Instruction No. 29 accurately reflects the law. 
See supra Part I; Aplt. Br. at 27-50; Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 (setting the "Legal 
rate"). The Western States defendants would not have agreed to it in the first 
place otherwise. There was no error of law. 
Contrary to Western States' position, parties resolve legal issues through 
stipulations all the time; but this is not the same as binding the Court on the law. 
In Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, 296 P.3d 709, for example, "the 
parties stipulated to a list of statements that were consistent with the district 
court's findings and conclusions, and additionally to a statement that resolved 
the remaining claim in favor of the defendants." Id. ,r 1. Under Western States' 
rubric, such a stipulation would be unenforceable because it was a stipulation 
binding the court on the law. More accurately, it was a stipulation between the 
parties regarding how they would approach the resolution of pending legal 
claims. The same can be said for the stipulation in this case. Rather than 
stipulating to "points of law requiring judicial determination," First of Denver 
Mtge. Inv'rs v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521,527 (Utah 1979), the parties 
agreed to the rate to be applied if prejudgment interest were to be awarded, thus 







C. There Is No Proper "Reformation" of the Stipulation Based on 
"Mutual Mistake." 
Wes tern States seeks to justify the district court's decision by alleging the 
court "reformed" the stipulation based on what Western States calls a "mutual 
mistake that the prejudgment interest rate was stipulated at 10% and that this 
was the appropriate prejudgment interest rate." There was neither a mistake nor 
one that was mutual nor would it have properly been "reformed." See Prinsburg, 
2012 UT 94, iJ 16 ("Prinsburg' s mistaken belief about the effect of the 
[s]tipulation[] is unfortunate, but it does not change the result."). 
Western States has not set forth authority for the proposition that a 
district court may properly "reform" a parties' stipulation after the fact. Nor has 
it adduced clear and convincing evidence to do so. See F.D.I.C. v. Taylor, 2011 UT 
App 416, iJ 47,267 P.3d 949 (party seeking reformation has "the burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that there was a mutual mistake of 
fact") (citation and quotation omitted). This argument is D.O.A. 
D. The Fullers Did Not Invite the District Court's Error. 
Western States suggests the Fullers somehow "invited" the district court's 
abuse of discretion, though it fails to clearly articulate how this could be so. 
(Aplee. Br. at 36-39.) Western States suggests it was incumbent upon the Fullers 
to clarify the rate in question. Surely, a colloquy with the court in which the 
judge states "it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in your head" should 
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be sufficient clarification for any party acting reasonably to understand. Rather 
than" invite error," the Fullers subsequently sought to implement this ruling in 
their proposed judgment after the verdict, only to have the ruling undone in a 
way that exceeded the district court's appropriate exercise of discretion. 
Western States also posits that the district court's statement that "the 
amount is fine" is not an appealable ruling. (Aplee. Br. at 37.) The Fullers, 
however, are not trying to appeal the statement that "the amount is fine." 
Rather, that statement was part of an oral ruling in which the learned district 
judge concluded that a "10% calculation" would be made automatically on 
prejudgment interest if property damages were awarded and, in exchange, Jury 
Instruction No. 29 would be withdrawn. (R. 1969, at 71-73.) The Fullers have 
appealed the district court's subsequent decision ruling that no such agreement 
was reached or oral ruling made. (R. 1795-96.) The district court's latter decision 
was incorporated into and made part of the final judgment and is properly 
before this Court on appeal. 
Western States' citation to Braun v. Nevada Chemicals, Inc., 2010 UT App 
188, 236 P3d 176, is not on point. There was no appealable decision made in 
Braun, as the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed his complaint. Id. ,I 14. Here, in 
contrast, the dish·ict court specifically ruled that the 10% rate agreed to by the 
parties and articulated by the court as part of the stipulated oral ruling would 
not be enforced. 
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The Western States defendants also say error was invited because the 
Fullers withdrew the jury instruction without clarifying the scope of the 
agreement. (Aplee. Br. at 38.) This is not invited error, nor does it have a sound 
factual premise. The Fullers had the benefit of the district court actually 
articulating on the record that a 10% calculation would be used. If they are not 
entitled to rely on this, then the English language carries no meaning. 
E. The Court Should Reject Western States' Untoward Accusations. 
In this appeal, Western States now purports to take umbrage with the 
Fullers' description of what happened in the district court. (Aplee. Br. at 39-40.) 
This is a tempest in a teapot. The same appropriately descriptive idioms drew 
no objection from Western States in the district court when properly used to 
describe Western States' redirection of its litigation strategy after receiving an 
unfavorable verdict. (R. 1775-80.) Contrary to Western States' argument, this 
Court should not strike anything from the record. Nor are the Fullers asking the 
Court to make a finding of fraudulent inducement. 
Western States suggests here, as it did below, that it in fact meant 
something different from what it said when entering the stipulation. (E.g., Aplee. 
Br. at 29 nn. 15-16.) The Fullers are justified in arguing that if Western States had 
meant something different, it had the obligation to say so when the district court 
articulated in open court the 10% standard that would be applied and not to 
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wait until after the Fullers relied on their statements before asserting a contrary 
meaning. 
A finding of wrongdoing by Western States is not a necessary prerequisite 
to a proper decision here, and the Fullers do not suggest it is. But neither can 
Western States advance a justifiable basis for making statements on the record 
inducing the Fullers to forgo an approved jury instruction, then going back on 
that agreement by claiming there had never been an agreement of any kind other than 
to transfer all prejudgment interest decisions to the judge. That position proved 
insupportable in the end, and Western States found itself required to retreat to 
alternative positions, as it continues to do now on appeal. Given the actual state 
of the record, not to mention the strong rhetoric sprinkled liberally throughout 
its own appeal brief, Western States protests too much. The district court 
recognized the Fullers had been "led into withdrawing that instruction" 
through representations the Western States defendants later tried to repudiate. 
(R. 1973, at 6-7.) 
Nor are the Fullers impugning the integrity of the district court in the 
least. To the contrary, they have taken great pains to point out that the district 
court's exercise of discretion exceeding appropriate judicial bounds was 1nore 
than likely unintentional. (Aplt. Br. at 25 n.5.) District judges are busy, with 
much on their judicial plates. The judge did not have the benefit of a written 




went back and forth on his recollection of what had taken place, first agreeing, 
then disagreeing, then reagreeing in part. (R. 1971, at 14-15; 1795-96; 1973, at 1-
12). He made his decision while juggling multiple other post-trial issues in the 
case, handling a trial judge's full docket, and preparing for senatorial review of 
an appointment to the state appellate courts. (R. 1792-96; 1970, at 3; 1973, at 1-2.) 
Despite the Fullers' urging, the district judge overlooked or omitted to recognize 
that portion of the record where he had articulated the 10% standard in 
connection with the parties' agreement. While the oversight is understandable, 
it does not change the nature of the prejudicial error. This is the very reason 
why appellate review is necessary. 
F. Western States Confuses Preservation With Estoppel. 
In a final point about the stipulation, Western States argues that it 
preserved its arguments on the interest rate and therefore is not estopped from 
raising them. (Aplee. Br. at 41.) Western States confuses preservation with 
estoppel. See Prinsburg, 2012 UT 94, il 19 ( distinguishing preservation of a 
challenge to a stipulation with estoppel from challenging one). This argument 
does not advance the ball. The Fullers have not suggested that Western States 
failed to preserve any arguments it makes in its response brief. 
In sum, Wes tern States advances no persuasive argument in its attacks on 
the stipulation. That agreement should be enforced as first articulated by the 
district court at the time the stipulation was made: it's a simple 10% calculation, 
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and you can do it in your head. This Court should reverse and remand for that 
simple calculation to be done. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the district court's decision and remand with 
an order that prejudgment interest should be applied using the 10% legal rate 
agreed to by the parties and dictated by statute. If the Court disagrees, it should 
nevertheless reverse the district court's decision and remand with an order to 
consider and articulate the appropriate interest rate that should apply under all 
the circumstances of this case.4 
4 There is no basis for an award of fees and costs to the Western States 
defendants. (Aplee. Br. at 43.) The district court awarded costs to the Fullers as 
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1241. Legal rate of interest. 1'he legnl rate of interest upon the loa11 j,c 
forbearance of any m01wyt goods! or things in nction shall be eight per (•eut 
per nnnum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in, nL" 
way affect any contract or obligation made before tho taking effect of th;\ 
title. .Am'd '07, p. 43. 
Jndgnwnt to include interest, § 3.'353. 
'fhe tumry law or 1907 wns taken nlmost ver-
bntim from tho stntut.es of N"w York. 
Usurious bond and mortgage enforced. 1n n 
stut(~ wher(~ Hwre is a sttLtutc makin~ usurv ~nnl 
b1tt not, dednriug the contract \•okl. n usurious 
boud and luort,_,ngc mny be, enforced for the 
amount nctuulfr dmt. 
H<>mheit!d v.'Vinmm, 80 LT. S. 170; not reported 
in Utah r<':port~. 
Interest to maturity of note. Au ~renucnt to 
pay inh•TI;'iit on n not(• whid1 prO\·idt-s for ''iutc-rest 
at th«' mt<• of two J>l:~r etmt rwr month from dnte," 
dol~ not <ixt,•nd tw\'nnd the time suid nok 1.Jt•com•~ 
due tmd pavnbh• by it~ C-1mn.1S. 
Ptit·ry v;'lt\ylor, 1 U. 03. 
An account stated carries interest fr<m1 tht? dnv 
c,f iti, Hquidnt.ion. . . . · 
G(xlb,1 v. Youug, 1 U. ,;5; rlffirmed 82 U. 8. 5G2. 
Intero$t on Judgment is statutory. Without 
tht., nuthoril.\· n !l 8t.ot.ute it, h, error for n. judgtaetit 
to dirPct thrit tlw jwl~mt•ut lw:\r int«•n$t. 
RtffC v. Iinott~ 3 (t, -IM; 24 P. 757. 
Rule of partial payments. Th(' rule for comput-
ing iuh•n•i,t wlwn tlWN! lm\'e b<'(•Jl pnrtinl pnv-
mt.~nts ii! to apply tlw pnynwnt to tho d.isdm~e of 
tho inten•st ilu••, nml if t tw p:l\'ment exct•1~ds the 
interest, Un, ~urphli. gm~ toward dhwha~ng tlm 
prinr.ipnl; if the pnym••nt Im fos.<1 tb:m tlit'~ int,,rt~t, 
the 1mrplu& of th£, intun•i-.t due mul½t nut he ti~k•m t.(, 
n.ugment tho prindpnl, hut intt•rest. rontinut~ ou 
tlH~ rornmr prindpnl until th<' 1wriod whtin the p:w-
mNlti.1 t:n.kN1 h>~dlwr ,ixc(•ecl tltti int<i1·est dm\ niid 
tlwn t:h~ surpluf-1 is to lK• upplh·tl tuwrtrd dhwhnrg~ 
1nj! tho f)rint.~1pnl. 
Pt>rry v. 'foylor, 1 l'. 63. 
Compound interest. ln n dN'rt-.• of forw.lo1n1ro 
of tntst d"t•(l, compound inter<'st is not allownhl<', 
n.nd tho dreree should nllow int,e,rest onhy r.m ifs;, 
principnl nt the lJti.f)tdated mte of 18 }lt'!r (itmf;. 
Shtvurl.$ Itnp~ C;.0~ v. South Ogdf.n L. It & 1. t ·., , 
20 U. :.1fl7; 58 P. 843. 
Where the evidonuu in the rocord is not sttffi6i ;.t 
to justify the c..omputntion of in~rt~t uprm an i·<• 
cmmt <mrront, py monthly n.-sts, it is t~rror to id1 "' 
s,wh comput.nttm1. 
.fon(-s v. Galligher, 9U.126i 33 P. 417. 
INTEREST AS DAMAGES: 
lI a ,ll·ht ought to be pald nt a particular i 1 i,i•· 
o.tul i1t not, owing to the defu.ult of the debtor, 
t.\rt~ditor iH cntitk~ to inten'fft from thnt fom>, 
w:w of cumpcn$U(fon for tlw (b•luy io puyowrit. 
Young v. Godbe1 82 U.S. 502. 
WlH!tc a ptJrchn$(~r 1tgrcri- to f!aY lnto c:(mr-t t!w 
purchn$u JJl'We of ft wUw cone(irmng which th•.-·, ,,n, 
de1r huN litigntion, th,~ former will b,, linul('- for ir,, 
t•Jrt•i;;t 1lurin~ t:Jw time he withholdia. tho tnont•y, 
Wn~ntch Mining Co. v. Crc,iC(•nt Mining Cn., 7 (' 
8; 2·1 P. 586; affirmed 151 U. 8. 317, 
\Vlu-rt? it•ten~t jg rcc:owJrnblc• n.s <hunagcs ff,r • i, • 
J::i.r in/>nyment~ it i~ a mnthir ln~ely in the di," 0 ,,. 
tum o the court. 
Culmer v. Cu.inc, 22 U. 210; 01 P. 100S, 
ln tort- for unHtJUidah~I dnmu,rt-s, Jllnintiff b, H 
entitled t-0 interr!'lt fN,m ttme of bringinKaetim, 
. Woodlnnd v. u. P. Ry., 27 u. Ma,·20 P. 2H~; .j,k 
c1tltid lSHt but not rt~po1·tt•d. 
ln t.ort for u.uU9uidnt,~tl .lntnrtRe~r antr,r<•s.t (m 'h,, 
r.humtget1 fi/~,~~<l from tho dath• or tho C011llW',,r>'• 
nwnt of the Mtion up to tlu~ dntt, or the v,•nl'., ! i,.. 
not rt'<'o,·rrnhll.'. 
) l;<'Stcr , •. Jligblnntl Bor G. ~I. Co., 27 U. 47!!. :-11 
l .• Hl. 
Niehol!\ , •. U. P. lt. R Co., 7 C. !HO; 27 P. ti~i:! 
1241x. Maximum rate. Exceptions, The pnrtfos to any contract mi:,' 
agree in writing f:or the pnymeut of intere8t, for the loan or forbearance of iHi.V 
n10ney, goods, o.r things in actionr not to nx<~necl twelve 1mr mmL per aum;rn, 
pro·vided, that on loans of tnoncy only to the amount of $100 or less1 it n,ny Ii!' 
ngrl~ed in writing to tuke or receive ns interpst on said loan not to exect~d #.l 
for the first mouth only o.f Nahl loan. hut thereafter uo grr.ntcr interest ~!di 
he eoiitraeted for, tnkt~n or reecivetl tlum iH nllowed in this section. Thi+:1 
proviso shall not he eonstrued so as to allow or permit the splitting up i>f 
transactions for the Joan of monry into small amounts for t.hP- pm·1ww· A 
()Vntling the provisions of this title. '07, p . .i.a. 
l'rior t.o ndoption of U J2H-1241xl 1, an ngrt•<>nwnt. for nny nltc of inter<>"-t wns lnwful in Utah. 
1241xl. Id. No pei·son~ nssocintion, or eorporation shnJJ directly m· in· 
dit'eetly h1lrn or i • ('eeh•e in mo.Hc,y! g()fHls. or things in adiou, or in nny oti,d' 
wny~ any grenter sum cw grMtm· vnlun for Um Imm or forhenr,meo of ii,,y 
1nouey, goods. or things in ndion. thnn is preHcrihed in § 12-1-lx. '07. p. FL 
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-~ . 
536 IN'I'OXICA'fING LICtUOl~S. 
couti·ncts 01· sacm•ities dolivorcd u,p _if in possession of the· cle·foudnnt in 11.,. 
action; a_nd if the snme be m tlHt possession of the plnint:iff, provision shnll i.,. 
made. in tbo ,judgment or tlccr<m in tho nution removing the .cloud nf KH•-ii 
usurious contl'ncts 01• se,:m•it.iC$ from the tit.le to strnb prnpl11·ty. 107, p. ;:, 
1241x9, Interest before e;nd afte1· judgment. Auy jndgmont 1•tmcl1•r· ,1 
on n lnwflll cou1a·nct sbtlll eonform tlrnreto nnd shnll hcm1• the intnr<:•st. 1u{1·,. ,: 
upon hy t.he pm·ties, which slrn.11 lw specified in the .iudgnwut.; other .im1g11w · ... 
shnll h<-m1· interest nt the rote~ of Pight ptH' c~c1 nt p1tr nnunm, which slwll 1 .. -
speain~d in the judgment. R. S. '98, § 1241 _; '07, p. 45. 
Jmigrncnt to. in~Jutio ini.croat Arter vt•rclicli or dcl'isioti, § 3353, 
.jijiix-10." N:<>t usurious, when. rl'he di1rnount. sulc, 11nd trnusfer i11 : !w 
rogµlnr cottr$;c· irl: lmshieas of negotiuhle paper· by one not the mn,ker tltPr,· ,:" 
without intent to violate~ thiR titk1 slrnll not be const"l'uecl m1 usm·ions. 
. '07, p. 4.~, 
1241xll. Bona fl.de lease itpon shares of real and personal property not 
usurious. 'l'he bona fide Jimse npnn Hluu•es of rm1l and pcrsonnl proptn·t., ,.,. 
tbe owrnw thr.roof shnJJ not he ~onf!tl-1u~d m; n mmriomt contract. '07, p . .r, 
TITLE 39. 
lN'l'OXICAr.rING LIQUOl{S. 
1:242. License neoessary. No person slu1Il m,mufn:!tt\ro, Rell. bnrt.er. ,i,•:.i 
oul, qr othc1·wisc: diSJ)08e of nny spil'itnouR, vinons, malt_, 01' othe1· intoxi,•ii! ''It! 
li(ttl'6~, without ffrat'_ obt:ninlng from the hon rel of county crm1.n1h-u-1io11ers 1,f 'b-
countK or cit.y council of the .aity, or hoard crf tl'ustees of the town in "i- 11 •i: 
he 'intends to do huHittesR, a liccm:w thel'o£or, ns hercinnftlW pr·oviid.od. 
t'ow~ht granted l-o l!ity council, § 20<>, l'luh, •Jl. 
l'owl!r!fgnmted to tuwu t.ntstmis, § 302, sub. II. 
Puw<•ri. gnmt,r.d to bonrcl of county ro1111w ······ 
mi;, i 011, 1mb. 11. 
-1243. Id. Who ma,y grant. Petition. Bond. 'rlw bo,mls o.f r11u•11_,_. 
connnissidnm'S in their· 1·especttve count.ios, and the city com1ail$. ill tlwir r•·· '· 
spec,tive cities, ·a.nd tl1e .bo'nl'ds· of trt1stees-i11 l;hch· 1·eRpcntive townR, Hl't.~ lw,·, ":· 
mttl~orizadto · gi~ant licenses, llR ,~ontcm1)lat.ecl hl § 1242,. to 1my person. o \'t!r ; h• 
nge' of_" tw6nt~r-one ycn11s1 npoh m1 11ppli!!nt:ion be"ing made for such linen~•-. ln 
petition si-gnod by tlrn npplicnnt ond flled witl1 the cuunty nlcrk, city rP1•t11·• !,·r. 
01· town <.!1et·k, as t;ho c-nse may hu. Sniu petition mnsl: stato ·definit11lJ• tlw 1 ;H'· 
t.ioulal' place nt which nny of 1;he liqnol's nnmcd in § 1242 nr<• intcmcfocl 1 • !,,. 
mnnufncturecl, sold, bn1•tered, dealt cmt. or othe~·wh-11? d ispos<!cl ot nnd wh• · h,-~ 
the· npplieant intends to cnrry 011 n rotnil or wholesuln business. Bc>J',.,, ·1 
lfoOrise is gl'anted to the npp]fol\nt he shnll execute n l>orHl to thn count,~-. ···I~ 
-or tow111 M the cnse nrn.y be, conditionc!d thnt ·during t.he <mutinu11nt!e 11 : I,;~ 
liuot1s0 ho·wm keep nn orderly n.nd well-rogulnted house; thn.t. he will 111,' ;i!-
'1m":ltah1bling 1\;itli . o&rcl..~, cl.ice, 01· nnr otl1er devJc~ · or ·-il'.l'.lplemm~ts. UR<'• 1 in 
;g"ftnib1-h1g-, witllfo his Jfousc, m1t-house, ~,nr"d. 01· othor promiseR uiltlcr ·11 is ·1111• 
·troJ;)tliri.t he ,,,ill -pnt nll dam.n.ges, flncR, nnd fCJt-fcitm~es wl1icb may h, .11l-
j11tlgccf.~g~it1st him uncler a11y of" the ~rnyiaiont1 nf thia tiotlc; Said bom~ -.!wll 
bo fixed by thll hon.rd c>-f connt;Y cmnm1ss10rinJ·s,. cit.y oouucil, or l)otwd ,,f ; ''"''" 










3316. Continuation of benefits. In the event of the termination of 
membership in the society by the person responsible for the support of any 
child, on whose account a certificate may have been issued, as provided 
herein, the certificate may be continued for the benefit of the estate of the 
child, provided the contributions are continued, or for the benefit of any 
other person responsible for the support and maintenance of such child, 
who shall assume the payment of the required contributions. 
TITLE 53. 
INTEREST. 
3320. (1241.) Legal rate of interest. The legal rate of interest upon 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action shall he 
eight per cent per annum. But nothing herein contained shall be so con-
strued as to in any way affect any contract or obligation made before the: 
taking cff ect of this title. Am 'd '07, p. 43. 
Judgment to Include Interest, I 7060. amounting to prln<"hmJ and JS per cent per 
Tho usury law oC 1007 was taken almost vcr- annum Interest. 
bnllm from the etatutes oC New York. Carter v. West, 38 u. 381: 113 P. 1026. 
Interest on email loo.ns, § 4384. F:ngert v, Chadwick, 40 0. 230i 120 P. 323. 
Publtc funds to draw Interest, § •soo. In an artlon ngnlnst a r.lty, fnr extnlR under 
In o. stato where there Is n eta.lute making a contract, Interest should ho nllowed nt least 
usury penal but not declaring the contract Crom lhi- time thP <'lnlm was presentc<I. 
void, o. u~urlous bond nnd mortgago mny be Wilson v, s. L. City, 61 U. -; 173 P. -. 
enforced for the a.mount actually due, 
Bernhelsel v. 1-'lrman, 89 U. S. 170; not re- INTEREST AS DAMAGES: 
pnrtecl In Utah reports. If a debt ought to be paht nt n. pnrllcula.1· 
An Hgrnement to pny Interest on n note tlmo und Is not, owing to tho ,leCnult or the 
which pro\'lcles for "Interest o.t the rnte of two 11Phtor, the creditor Is enlltlecl tn lnterP.~t rrnm 
per cent per month from date," tloea not ex- that time, by way ot compensation for the de-
tend heyorid tho time snld note be<•omcs due Jny In pnymcnt. 
uncl r,n.ynblc by lls terms. Young v. Godbe, 112 U. R. 662. 
Perry v. •r,Lylor, l U. 63. 'Where n purchuser ngree11 lo pay Into court 
An account stated carTles lnlerest from the the purchnso price or n mine concerning which 
dny ur lie 1lquld11tlon. the vendor hns lllhmtlon, the former wlll hA 
Go<llic v. Young, 1 U. 55; 1tffirmcd 82 u. s. Uablo tor Interest clurlng tho trmd he wlt.h• 
r.r.z. hohls the mnnc:,·. 
Without the R.Uthorlty or o. atntute It Is \Vusal<'h Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining Co., 
error tor a judgment lo ,ure<'l that the Ju11g- 7 11. 8: 2-1 P. r,86: oft1rmed Hil U. S. :J17. 
mflnt benr Interest, Where tntereNt Is recoverable su1 damng<>s ror 
Rt>ct•e v. Knott> 3 U. 41it: 24 P. 767. dclny In 1myment, It Is u. mn.tlor lurgoly In the 
The rule tor comrrnllng Jntcrcet when there 11lecretlon of tho court. 
hn,·e been pnrtlnl pnyments 111 to npply the Culmer v. Cnlnt-. 22 U. 2lll: GI P. 1008. 
1myment to the dlschurge of the lntereet due, In tort for unllqulclnterl dnmngPs, plnlntllT 
nn1l IC the pnyment exceeds the lnterent, the held entltll'cl to Interest trom time ot hrlug-
Hm·11lue goes towa.r,l dlecharglng the i,rlncl- Ing action. 
11111: tr the puyment he lees tlurn the lntoreRL, Woodlnntl v. U, P. R)'., 27 l.T, G-13: 26 P. 
tho HUl'IJIUS uf the Jnterest due muat not he 2!18; declclecl l8!H hut not rE'JlortNl. 
l1tken to augment the prlnclpnl, but lnteroRt In tort for unllqul1lated dnmnges, lntel'eel nn 
roullnuc1:1 on the Cnrmer prlnclpnl ut1lll the the <lnmngt-e n1uies11cd rrnm tht- 1lnto or thP 
rw1·lrnl when tho puymcnts tnken toge-I her ox- f'onunen<'cmrmt of the rlcllon 111, tu lhP. dntc nf 
1•cctl the intereel due, und then lht' eur11lu11 the verdlr•t IR not rccnverahle. 
111 to be upplled toworrl rllschna·glng the prln- l,e11ter v. lllgl1l;Ln1l Hoy o. l\1. Co., 27 u. 470; 
cl111ll. 7G P. 3~ 1. 
Perry v. Taylor, 1 U. 63. Nichols v. U. P, R, n. Ctl., 7 U, 510; 27 P. 
In n. cler.ree of Corel'louure or trust dee<1, com- 6!>3. 
I II b l I I 1 llflm11ge11 for Injury to n. shipment whfle J!nUnd lnlcl'cst ,. not n nwn e, ntu I te I errc-e In transit IR the llmount of lnRR, with lnlf'-reRt, 
should nllow Interest only on tho principal at from the llml' ot ,le)h•er)·; the fac-t thnt the 
the ettpulCltti,l rnte or 18 per cent. clamngcs nre unllqulrlnted nnt being by llselr 
Ht<-v<-ns Imp. Co. v. ~u th Ogilen L. B. & J. rAneon fnr nnt nllowlnir Interest. 
C'o., 20 u. 2G7j !i8 P. 843. 1' .. el v. U, p, R)·. Co., 32 U, 11'11: SR p. 1003. 
,v11ere the evidence In the record IH not .RUC• Interest on rlninages fnr lun,I ctinclenmr.cl 
llc•lent tn Justify lho computntlon or lntl'rcst flhouhl he comput.ecl from thR tlrne the <'Ont• 
111111n un uccount current, by monthly rests, puny takes posee11stnn. 
It le orrnr to allow such comrmtntlnn. s. P., 1 ... A. & R. J,. n. Co. v. ml. oC l•M1wa-
.lonca v. 011lllgher, 0 U, 12G: 33 P. 417. lion, 32 U. 101: !19 P, 263. 
Where 11 note provliles for Interest In Tl'J;'• \Vhere lntcroRl IA n IE'gnl cone~r1uem•e or 1L 
11lnr ln~tnhnonts nncl the mnlcer dernultert, hP. clt>mnnrl without 11111,uhtllon IL ma.y he re-
le llahlo for Interest on tho sum,r In de(nult nt covered, though nol clnlmcrl In the 1,hmcllni;tR, 
the rnte nC 8 11er <'Ont. nn1l lntere!lt la alloworl In n tnrt, wherP per-
.Jenai-n v. t,lchtenstcln, 45 U. 320: 146 P. 10:IG. Ronni property IR destrn)·ed, rrnm the d1Llo nC 
HHcovery ror monoy l11nnc1l clenll'cl u~ unt'on- the cleatntctlon 
lll'lonnh1e, where there hns ht'P.n r<-1•nhl n Kum Wheatley v. 0. S. l, .. 4!1 P. JOii: H12 P. 86. 
3321. (1241x.) Maximum rate, Exceptions. The parties to any con-
tract mny agree in writing for the payment of intcrc!>t, for the loan or forbear-
ance o( any money, goods, or things in nction, not to exceed twelve per cent 
per nmmm; prm•idt'd, thnt on loi\ns of money only to the amount of $100 or 
less it may he agreed in writing to take or receive as interest on said loan not 












interest shall he contracted for, taken or received than is allowed in this 
section. This proviso shall not be construed so as to allow or permit the 
splitting up of transactions for the loan of money into small amounts for 
the purpose of evading the provisions of this title. '07, p. 43. 
Prior to §§ 3320-3332, an agreement for any without the knowledge of the prlncl11al, and 
rate of Interest wns lawful In Utnh. the prlnclpal received no pnrt of the usury, the 
Interest on emnll loans, § 43!12. principal v.·a.s not chargeable with the effects 
Wh<'TC money was left by n. principal with nn of the n,rent'e mlscomluct. 
agent to be lnnned, and the ngcnt took usury Brown v. Johnson, .f3 U. 1 i 134 P. 590. 
3322. (124lxl.) Id. Penalty. No person, association, or corporation 
shall, directly or indirectly, take or receive any money, goods, or things in 
action, or in any other way, any greater sum or greater value for the loan 
or forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action than is prescribed 
in § 3321. Any person, association, or corporation, their or its agents, serv-
ants, employcs, clerks, or attorneys, violating any of the provisions of this 
section is guilty of a misdemeanor. '07, p. 43; am'd '09, p. 180. 
Tf two conRlructlons are possible, the court cause the Interest would not PRY him for look-
wlll to.ko the one ngalnst usury, a.nd a cor- Ing up the security, and the borrower agreed 
rupt or unlawful Intent to violate the usury law to pa.y a rea1mna.ble amount for examining the 
on the part or the lender le eeeentlal to render securities, the acceptance of ouch o.n amount 
the contract usurious. does not constitute usury. 
Cobb v. Hnrtensteln, 47 u. 174: 152 P. 424. Fisher v. Adamson et al., 4'1 U. 3: 161 P. 
Where a londer refused to make a loan be- 361. 
3323. (124lx2.) May recover usurious loans or forbearance. Every 
person who, for any such loan or forbearance, shall pay or deliver any sum 
or value than is above allowed to be received, or the principal or any part 
thereof of said usurious loan <'>r forbearance, and his personal representatives, 
may recover in an action against the person who shall have taken or received 
the same, and his personal representative, the amount of money so paid or 
value delivered, both as principal and interest, if such action be brought 
within one year after such payment or delivery. If such action be not 
brought within said one year and prosecuted with diligence, then the said 
sum may be sued for and recovered with costs at any time within three 
years after the said one year hy any county superintendent of schools of the 
county where such payment may have been made, for the use and benefit 
of the county school fnncl, and when collected shall be forthwith paid into 
said fund. '07, p. 43. 
In an action to recover back the plnlntlrr Is This section le not appllcable to an action 
not bound to establlsh the usury beyond a to recover pledged property. 
renf'onnhle douht. This act Is constltutlonal. Conner v. Smith, 60 U. -; 169 P. 168. 
Cobb v. Ho.rtenstcln, nu. 174: 162 r. 424, 
3324. (124lx3.) Bonds, etc., void, when. All bonds, bills, notes, as-
surances, conveyances, mortgages, deeds of trust, all other contracts or 
securities whatsoever, and all deposits of goods or other things whatsoever, 
,.,·hereupon or whereby there shall he reserved or taken or secured, or agreed 
to he rcse-rved or taken, any greater sum or greater value for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or other things in action than is above pre-
scribed, shall be void; but this title shall not affect such contracts as have 
hecn made previous to the time it shall take effect. '07, p. 44. 
Cited In Culmer Paint & Glass Co. v. Gleueon Roaenhlum v. Gomoll et al., 61 U. -: 173 P. 
ot al., 42 u. 344: 130 P. 66. 24a. 
A negotlnble note, lalnto<l with usury Is not To torfelt a note tor usury the proof must be 
void nR against an Innocent purcha11er tor clenr and convincing. 
value borore maturity, Jd. 
332S. (1241x4.) When complaint ia 6led for discovery of money, etc., 
borrower need not offer to pay interest, etc. ~'henever any borrower of any 
money, goocls, or things in action shall file a complaint for the discovery of 
the money, goods, or things in action taken or received in violation of this 
title, it shall not he necessary for him to pay or offer to pay any interest 
whatever on the sum or thing loaned; nor shall any court require or compel 
the payment or deposit of the principal sum or thing, or any part thereof, as 
a condition to the granting of relief to the borrower in any case of a usurious 
loan forhiddr.n by this title. '07, p. 44. 
3326. (1241x5.) Interest, how calculated. Whenever in any statute, 
act, dee<I, written or verbal contract, or in any public or private instrument 




whatever, any certain rate of interest is or shall he mentioned an<l no period. 
of time is stated for which such rnte is to he calculntecl, interest shall he 
calculated at the rate mentioned by the year, in the same h1anncr as if the 
words per annum or by the year had been added to such a rate. 107. p. 44. 
3327. (124lx6,) Defendent may call and examine plaintiff. Whenever 
in any action the <le fondant shalt plead or gi\'C notice of the defense of usnry 
and shall verify the truth of his plea or notice by affid.wit, he may, for the 
purpose of proving the usury, calJ and examine the plaintiff as a witness in the 
same manner as other witnesses may be called nn<l examined. '07, p. 44. 
3328. (1241x7.) Offender to answer to any complaint filed against him. 
Every person offending against the provisions of this title may be compelled 
to answer on oath any complaint that shall be filed against him in any court 
for relief. '07, p. 44. 
3329. (124lx8,) Court ahaU declare any bond, etc., void, when. When-
ever it shall satisfactorily appear by the-·admission of the party, or hy proof, 
that any bond, biU, note, assurance, pledge, conveyance, mortgage, deed o[ 
trust, contract, se,:uritv, or other evidence of debt has been taken or re-
ceived in violation of the provision of this title, the conrt shall declare the 
same· to be void, and enjoin any prosecution thereon, and order the same to 
be surrendered and canceled, and any property, real or personal. embraced 
within the term of said contracts or securities delivered up if in posse!-sicm 
of the defendant tn the action; and if the same he in the possession of the 
plaintiff, provision shall be made in the judgment or decree in the action 
rC'moving the cloud of such usurious contracts or securities from the title 
· ·to such property. '07, p. 45. 
A f<>rtelture tor usun· wlll not be declnrecl Forrellur<>a hereunder enrorcc,1 only when 
except on clear nnd convlnt-lng evidence tha.t pronf Is c•lear 1md convlndng. 
the lender pa.rlklpnted In or benefited by the Culmer Pnlnt & Olltse Co. v. Olcn1wn et nl., 
t1•nns1icuon. 42 u. 344: 130 P. li6. 
Brown v. Johnson, 43 U. 1; 134 P. 590. RoKcnblum v. Gomoll, lil U. -; li3 I'. :?13. 
3330. (1241x9.) Interest before and after judgment. Any judgment 
r~ncler<'cl on a lawful contract shalt con form thereto and shall hear the in-
terest agreed upon by the parties, which shall ·be specified in the judgment; 
other judgments shall benr interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum, 
which shall he spcdtit"d in the judgment. R. S. '98, § 1241; '07, p. 45. 
Jutlgment -to Include lr.t.erest a!ter verdict or decision. § 7050. 
3331. (1241x10.) Not usurious, when. The discount, sale, and trans-
fer in the regular cottr!'~ of business of negotiable paper by one not the maker 
~hereof without intent to violate this title shall not he construed as usu-
rimts. '07, p. 45. 
A hol<ler without knowledge or previous 
uaurlous transactions may rec:over on thr. note. 
Roeenblurn vs. Gomoll, 61 1!. -; 173 P. 243. 
3332, (1241xll.) Bona fide lease upon shares of real and personal· 
property not usurious. The bona fide lease upon shares of real nnd personal 
propc.-rty by the owner thereof shall not he construed as a usurious con trnct. 
'07, p. 45. 
One plerlglng proporty to eerure the pnl·ment 
or u uaurlous lonn, and making payments ng-
grC>gatlng more thnn tho money horruwed, hnR 
n right, under \his section, to recover tho 
pl<>dgell propcrt)', U 8UC'.h f\Ctlon IR !'UhJ<H·t to 
nny period or llmltallon It ls thnt tlxr•cl hr thP 
gcneru.l BtlllUlf'II, 
Connor. v. Smith, 51 U. -; Jfi!l r. ms. 
8 
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[609] INTE.RES'l' 44 .. 0 .. 1-H .. o-s 
TITLE 44 
INTEREST 
,u-o ... l. LcJ.{al Unte. 
The legal rate of interest for the loan or for* 
heatancc of any money, goods or things in action 
shall be eight per cent. per annum. But nothing 
herein contained shall be so c<rndtrued as to in 
any way affect uny contract or obligation made 
he fore tlw l <1th day of Muy, 1907. 
(C. L. 17, -~ :{:{20.) 
-H-·-0--2. Maximum Rates. 
The partit•s to a11y contract may agree in writ• 
ing for tlu.~ payment of int.ere.Ht for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods or things in ac• 
tion, not to exc.·eedr ux.cept as otherwiim provided 
by law, twclve per cent per annum; pt<H1idecl, 
that on loan!'l of money only, to the amount of 
$100 or Jes~. it may he agret~d in writing to take 
or rci,;·eh'e as intcircst on such Joan not to exceed 
$1 fur the first month only of such loan, but 
thereafh~.• no greater interest shaJJ he contracted 
fot\ taken or received than is allo\vcd in this sec-
tion. Thi::: proviso shalJ not bf! construed to allow 
or permit the splitting up of transact.inns for the 
Joan of money into small amounts for the pur-
post: nf evading the pro,·isfons of thi::1 titl(.'. 
1.C. L. 17, ~ :rn21.) 
lb.\t' <•f i11t.-r(•:1t nllo·o\·1·•1: On Small Loanl\, ,.~.,,: To In<lustritll 
L'-.,~•tl <:~,rJ)orationA, 'i --~i-a; 'I\l Pa~~nhr<;.k(<r>.<. 70 ... 0 ... :!. 
l:!.•.f l":r annum :rn•I 1•.~ l>•'I' nwnih, the 1mnn,. Brl;wn \> • 
• lvhti:;on, 1g.1 f'. fitlO, -13 U. l, !!!I A. L H. 110:J. 
;1 t-0-:J. Cakuluc ed hv the Year. 
When(.)rnr in any ~iatute or deecL or ,vritten 
or vt•rbal contract. or in any public or privnte 
instrument whatenu•• any certain rate of interest 
is mentioned and no period of time i~ stated, in-
terest shall be culculated at the rnte mentioneo 
by the year. (C. L . .17, ~ :l:126.) 
-l<J ... Q ... 4. Jnten.•~t on Judgments. 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform thereto and shalJ bear the interest 
agteed upon by the parties, which ,hall he sped~ 
fled in the judgment; other judgments shall hear 
intm·est at tlu~ rate of t~ight per cent per annum. 
i'C. L. 11, * 3:rno.) 
Thi,; iwrtlt>n ha•1 nn it1'1>lknli,m i•x1·<•11t t11 JH'l'Hctnal jucl1rm,,nt,1. 
Sidrwy St(•V\•11;1 111111. l'o, v. So. 01-rd~n L. II. & Jnw. Cn,, 
,,i- l'. !<H. io U. '.!67. 
H---0,~5. Usury-Tuking Excessive lnterc~t n 
Misdemennnr. 
No per~wn shall, dirccOy or inditeetly, t.a.ke or 
:receive in ~i:.~rviceA, money nr other propt~rty, any 
grf.>ater ~um nr g1·enter nduc for the loan or for-
heuranee of any money, goods or thing:; in action 
than is prescribed in section 44~0-2. Any person 
violating nny of the provisions of thifi section 
is guilty of a misdemeanor. (C. L. 17. § :1a22.) 
H--0-6. Id. Contract,s Void. 
AJI bonds, bills, notes, assurances, convey-
ances, stocks. })ledges, mortgages and deeds of 
trust, and all other contracts and securities what-
goe\'er, and aJJ deposits of good.s or other things 
whatsoever, whereon or whereby there shall be 
reserved or taken or secured, or ngi-ec~d to be re-
sen·ed or taken or secured, any greater sum or 
greater ralue for a loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods or things in action than is above 
prescribed shall be void. ( C. L. 17, § 8324.) 
•14-0---7. Id. Ueconi..ry o( Payments-Limitn• 
tion of Action. 
Every person, or in the event of his death his 
personal representatives, who shall pay or de-
liver any greater sum or value than is allowed by 
this title to be received for or on any loan or for-
bearance, or who shall pay the principal or any 
part thereof of a usurfous loan or forbearance. 
may reco\·er from the person who shall have 
taken or received the same the amount of money 
so paid or value delivered, both of principal and 
interest, provided action is brought within one 
year after such payment or delivery. If such ac-
tion is not brought within said one year and 
prosecuted with diligence, then the superintend-
ent of public instruction may sue for and re-
cover such sums, with costs, at uny time within 
three years after said one year, for the use and 
benefit of the state district school fund, and the 
sum so collected shnll be forthwith paid into said 
fund. ( C. L. 17, § 3a2a.) 
Althvu$rh thi~ iw<•tion u-ives th(> ri;:ht o( !'ff0\'1?1'Y to the ll(,!'¥ 
t'(•Wfr or his pen;onnl ::-1tpre"'cmtntlrt;a, in view o( I 02-1 t.9 n l!<Ur-
vh,lnit JlllftMr m11y maintain th~ .ndion. ColiL v. Hnrh!n~u•in, 
Hi:? P. ·12·1, -li U. 174. 
,M-·0--8. Id. Hepayment of Comdderation Not 
n Condition Precedent. 
Whniever any borrnwer of money, goods or 
things iu action shall file a complaint for thci 
recover:· of tlw money. gnod8 or things in action 
taken or recdvcd in violation of this title, it .shull 
not lm necessary for him to pay c,r offer to pay 
any intcre:-:tt what<.>ver on the sum nr thing 
loaned: nor shall any court requirn or eompel 
Urn pa,rment nr deposit of the pl'ineipal sum or 
thing. or any part thereot, as a condition to the 
grantintr of t·t~Jief to the honow<~-• in any cn.se 
of n t1Httri<n1N Imm. (C. L. 17, * H325.) 
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t\xin,r dHTt-rcnt. rote, allowing interost 
at rnl.c o! 0 ,1jx cent.a on the hundred" by 
th~ year). 
Jowo Code 1oao, § 9404 (l'ftve centa on 
the huntJrecJ'' by the ye1u unless po.rtieJJ 
usm.-e in writing tor payment of interest 
not exceeding "seven centa on the hun• 
,lr-c-dH 1,y the yenr). 
l\lont, Hcv. Codes, § 7726 (in absence 
of expreas contrnct in writinsr fixing 
different r11tc, el x per cent r,er annum 
''except. [es lo] a judgment•), 
CrnRR• re-f ~rent't-B. 
Rcp;ullltion by special laws prohibited, 
Con~t. Art. VI,§ 26; payment of intercfit 
llS extcncHntr stntutc ol )imitations, I 04-
2-46. 
1. Pormer rate. 
Thus it will he seen that former rate 
wnR ten P'-'t' cent y,er annum. Openshaw 
v. t! lnh & N. Ry, Co., G U, 208, Zl P, 000, 
2. PawnbrokerH and money lenders. 
So far nR 7-6-3 conflicta with this 
Rection uncl title it must prev11il, for the 
former leKislutinn is a special and sub-
sequent ttct, and rcpenh1 uan IPWS In con-
1tlct" therewith. People's Finance & 
·rh1•ift Co, v. VnrnCl', 76 u. 366, 286 
P. :I04. 
3. lnHlalments. 
Whc1-e n note provided for p11yn1ent ot 
inlct'cKt. in regulu1· instalments and 
mok,r dcfeullcd, such mnker was 
linhlc fur int(.'rCftt on sums in default 
nt Tille of eight per cent, as fixed 
by this scrtion. J~nsen v. LichlcnRLein, 
46 U. a20, 145 P, 10:IG, 
.f. DehtA overdue. 
Tn Utuh, intercat in ollowecl on deb~ 
nver,lu~, even in ahaence of statute or 
contract providing therefor. Wasatch 
)fin. Co. v. Crescent Min. Co., 7 U. 8, 
Hi, 24 P. 6HO, ufT'd 151 U. 8, 317, 38 L. 
rM. 177, 1-t S. Ct. 348. 
!i. Sthool dlatrlct&. 
School district, where it hna received 
b~nt-fit or goods, ~hould pay Jcgal rate 
of intcre&t from date It received benefit 
uf its contract. Baker Lumber Co. v, 
.\. A. Clttrk Co., 6:J U, 3!J6, 178 P. 764, 
6. F.iteht of re,conry by borrower, 
WhP.rc one loaning money hod received 
full umount of money loanecl Rnd interest 
ut rule of 16 per cent per nnnum, debt 
wns fully paicl, nnd tencl<'r could not re-
cnv«!r nnylhin,r in ndclition. Corter v. 
W<'st, !l8 U. :J81, 113 P. 1026. 
-14--0-2. Maximum Rates. 
7. Determination o( earnlm: power of 
money. 
This rate cormot be uRc<l ns n baeia 
ot ua·L·iving .u.t the rcoaonublc l'Urnin.a 
power o( money, in csthn11tin,t ch,me~s 
plaintiff is 4!ntitled to in action tor ~r• 
1mnDJ injuries. KlinR'<! v. Southt'rn Pnc. 
R. Co.L. 89 U. 284, 280, 67 P.2cl :lli7, 106 
A, L, u, 204. 
lk-tiaionB from ol hn JqriKcUctions, 
- Federal, 
County bonds payable in New York, 
held to dn,w interest o.ltcr mnturity 
under tho Jaws of Iowa 11nd not uncicr 
thotte of NQw York. Cromwell v. Snc 
County, 06 U. S. 61, 24 L. E<l. 081. 
-Iowa. 
Where A contract is mode in one slut~ 
to he perfol'med in unother, the inl~l·cst 
will be computed nccording to the law 
or the place of p~rformnnce, but the 
purUes may stipulate thut inlQrc~t shall 
be c:ulculnte?d atecording lo the luw,1 of 
lhe place where the contruct i~ mudc. 
Butters v. OldR, 11 lown 1. 
Interest nt f!cven per cc>nt ncrordin1t 
to the luw of anolhcr Rlnlc is pro~rly 
nl1owed on money due un<l«."r u <:ontract 
made in thnt Rtnle to uvoicl u will con• 
test. Denson v. Suwycr, 210 luwo 841, 
240 N. W. 424. 
A stipulation !or n higher rult! or 
int.crest otter n111turit:,, iR properly en-
forced. Penn Mut. Life In11. Cn. v. 01·r, 
217 Iowa 1022, 262 N. W. 7-SS. 
.\. I... It no tea. 
Agreement to rcc<!i\'c Ronmthin,r other 
than money fo1· loun, 05 A. L. R. 
1231. 
ExpenseH or chnr~s (inclu<lin11: tuxes) 
incident to loun or mone?y, G:J A, 
L. R. R23. 
LKW of the lorunt os i?oVcrninJt tho 
ri1?ht to and rate of int.c.-r<'st ne <lam• 
ages tor delay in pnymct1l of moncv 
or discharge of othe?r ohlighllons. 
78 A. L. R. 1047. 
nutc of interest after m11turity on con• 
tmct naming rote but not cmployinr 
t~rm 11unti) r,uid.'' OT eimllur phrnec, 
76 A. L. R. 390. 
Rote or intc~at nttcr nrnturil)• on con• 
trn('tl\ fbin~ ruto uunlil puyn\cnt," 
6 A. (.,, R. 1 l OG. 
Stntut<'s in reh,tion lo int~rt'P.t ns ob. 
noxious to t'onatitutionol i,rovision 
a~ninat impoirinit ohlig11tion o( con-
lroct.8, R7 A. L. R. 402. 
Vnlitlity und elTcct or nnticlpntm·~• p1·0• 
vision in canlrnct in r<tlr&tion to rnLe 
of intereat in <'vent of rlefnult, 12 
A. L. R. :rn7. 
The parties to any contract may agree jn writing for the payment of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in 
action, not to exceed, except as otherwise provided by law, ten per cent 
12 
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per otmum; vro·-,:idecl, that on loans of money only, to the nmount of 
$100 or less, it may be agreed in writing to tnke or rect'ive ns intcre:-;t 
on ~uch loan not to exceed $1 for the firHt month only of such loan, but 
thereafter no greater. intere~t shall be contracted for, taken Ol' received 
than i~ ullowcd in thiM Rection. This proviso shall not be conMtruecl to 
nllow or permit the ~plitting up of trun~ections for the loan of mon<!y 
into t4mnll amounts for Lhe pUl'po.sc of evading the provi:don~ of thi~ 
title. 
No contract for the purchmse of any goods, wnre~ or merchancli~e or 
)mm or forbearnnc(! of money, shnll contnin any proviMion providing 
for H handling or ~crvice charge on any said contract, or any commercinl 
chnrge on Maid contract, or any charge whatKoever, which when taken 
together with the intere:.;t chnrged on Nai<l contract for lhc ~ale of good~. 
wares or merchandise, or for the loan or forbearance of mone)', exceed~ 
ten pe1· cent per annum of the unpaid principal ~um of Kaid loan or 
conh'nct, except; (a) a contract mny ~pecificallr provide for n Ncrvlce 
charge, which charge Hhnll not exceed four per ct?nt per annum of the 
unpaid bnluncc of the imid principal ~mm, :rnch 14ervicu churl(e to b<! 
npplied but once on uny trun~action and HhHll not be aga\in applied in 
cnsc of rerunding 01· rcllC\\'ttl of contrRct between the 1mrtieH concerned 
with the oJ·jginul tranHaction nor shall ,:such Hervice chnrgc be subject 
to nny ndditional 8crvice charge, intercHt charge or pennlt~·; (u) u 
reu~onable uttorncf:1 foe in cu~m of collection by an uttorney; ancl (c) 
~uch exceptiortl-4 UH are otherwiHe provided by law. 
Jntel'e~l accruing on lonn~, contracL .. , forbearance of mone)', good~. 
or thing~ in nction, under section:i 44-0-1 and 44-0-2, Revis~tl Stat-
utt!li of Utuh, 1!)3:J, when pttid in advnncc or othcrwhw ~hull not exceed 
the rate of lcn pur cent per nnnum. (C. L. 17, § 3321.) 
tfl,c(ory. 
.-\~ 111nt1ntlc•d lty L. !15, <"h, 42, ~ff. 
,Junl' 15, 11uh1-1tilulin~ ''trn,11 in third Jin<', 
fnr 0 tw<·lvl•/' nml uchJing J11Kt lwo pern• 
a:ru1>hR. 
Th~ 1wt•11c•nt MCt'lion hcnr~ litll<' simi• 
lu rit y tu i L~ precl<1c1.•~Rn1·s, except th11t it 
hu" nlwuy~ hl'l'n rrnvidi:>d that thl're nun· 
ht• n convt•ntiuniil rnl<'. R. S. 1808, 
~ l:!.tl: Comp. LtlWll 1907, § 1241x. 
C'nmpa.rahfo IJto·risinns. 
J,tuho C<>clci, 1!>40 Supp., §20-1906 
f nnl to <'xc,'Cd ci,:rht per cent per annum 
hy UJ:"l'<'<'nwnt. in writlnR'; on loan o! ,UOO 
or ll'ti~, whorl' inlt'rcst ehnrgcd for dura-
1 inn o( lonn ht lr~s thnn $1, scrvic~ cha)1fe 
mnr I><' 111ndr ('(tunl to difference between 
~um of $1 ancJ int<'r<!'l'l chorgc<l; judg. 
tnl'nl on ~uch conlrn<'t, inter-e11t at six 
per <'Ont ,,rr nnnurn). 
Mont. n ev. Codrs, § 772.(i ( not t.o C?X• 
rc<',I trn f}('I' cent J>l'r nnnum hy writt~n 
n,crrecn,<'n t). 
(" rnKK • r(' r f' rt' nfeA. 
Rnto nUowcd on !:'mall Jonna, 7-8--5, 
7-R-RB~ to industrial loan corporationa, 
i-6-:l: to pawnhroker11, 70-0-2; to c0w 
npernti"" hunkll, 7-7-16. 
J. Loan for )("tHt than one y~ar • 
L:nclcr former fl.Cction one per ci?nt a 
month woR prl\eisely 12 per cent per 
unnum, und thiA was e"'J)('ciolly M where 
lhl' loan w11a fo'r lrs~ than a whole yepr, 
Umwn v. Juhn~on, 4:J U. 1, 7, 134 P. 600, 
4Ci I,. R. A. (!-:. S.) 1167, Ann, C,u. 
HllH C :121. 
2. DdenRe ar usury, 
In ault lo forccloi:ac corpornlc mort• 
Jrlllfe, 11tockhol<ler e>( nmrla:ngor cnnnot 
intcrponc defense of usury prccli<'ntcci on 
Jdft,i nf Rtork to morlgn~cc hy oth(!r 
~tockholders which, iC added to intere,t 
provided in mortgage, would mHkc it 
u11uriou11, aince dden11c of u14ury is per• 
11onal to morl,l'OKor. RoapigJioJti v. Gl~n• 
alien Min. Co. (Grncc et al. 1 inter• 
vt-ncrs) 1 o9 U. 41, 262 P. 276. 
S.. Reconr7 on 11eurloa1 ttontrad. 
Jn action againat finance company to 
r~cover principal and lntereat on alleged 
u11urioua loan, demurrer to complaint 
11hould have been austained ln absence of 
allegation that contrcict waa made in 
Utah or wa11 subject to ill Jawa, Farrer 
v. AtJaa Acceptance Corp., 97 U, 261, 92 
P.2d 720. 
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44-0-3. Cnleulated by the Year. 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or verbnl contrnct, or in 
any public or privutc in~trument whnte\'cr, any certain rate of interc[d 
is mentioned and no period of time is ~tntcd, intcreKt ~hull be calcu-
Jated at the rate mentioned by the ycnr. (C. L. 17, § 3326.) 
A. L. It. notft. 
Con11trurtion of conlroctunl provisions 
u11 to interest us regards time from 
which int.nest iR to be ton1puted, 69 A . 
.t-t-0-f. Interest on Judgments. 
I ... It 068; time nt which interest is p11y-
uhle under will or controct providjnar 
!or payment of Interest, 10 A. L. R. 997. 
Any judgment rendered on a lawful contruct ~hall conform thereto 
and Rhall bear the intere~t 1\greed upon by the p1u·tics, which ::thnll l,e 
specified in the judgment: other judgmentR ~hnll bear interest at the 
rnte of eight per cent per annum. (C. L. 17, § 33:l0.) 
HINlory. 
The f\rat purt of this Rction is almoat 
iclenlicol with R, S. 1898. § 12,U; and 
this section ie exaetlv identical with 
{'omp. Luw11 1907, 1241x9. 
('ompaubJe provisions. 
Jnwa <.:odt'.\ 1039, § 9405 ( 5 cents on 100 
by th~ ycur, unless dift'cL·cnt t·atc is fixed 
hv contract on which judgment or decree 
i~ rendered, in which cusc intu-,Ht oc-
t·orclin~ to t'ontract but not exc~ding 7 
cents on 100 by the yeur). 
C'rotl8•n•f ert-nteR.. 
Intcr<1st to he included in judgment 
('nlr~·. 104-44-10. 
J. Gt'nere.1 •ppli~abllitJ' or R~tlon. 
Jt i~ only to perftonal Judgments that 
this 11ection applieA. Sidney Stevens 
Jmplcment Co. v. South Ogden Land, 
Hulldln,r & In,provcment Co., 20 U. 267, 
5A P. 84:J. 
2. Allul'·an<"~ of interl'et bltfore Juda'· 
numt. 
The true l(•st to be nppli(\d os to 
whtfth~r inbrl'st should be oUowetl he-
fore Judgmen~ ln a-lven aso or not 
i,1 not whether clnn111JteS nre unliquidiited 
1>r othcrwlac, but whether injury and 
t"oneequent dam11ges ore complete an<l 
must he ssrertainetl 11s of particular 
tln1c ond in act'ordRnce with fixed rulca 
of evidf'nce, Frll v. Union Pnc. Ry. Co., 
:12 t1. tot. 88 P. 100:J, 28 L. R. A. (N. 
S.) I, t:J Ann. Cns. 11!37. 
3. lntt-reRl on dam&Kes. 
Aw,,rd of intereRt on dumagca ~uff erecl 
hy 1·enRon of brench of building contruct 
from time they were suff'orcd at leRRl 
ruw held propl'.'r as ng-ainBt contention 
thnt J\incc dllmn5reR were unJiquidatcd, no 
inlercRt could be ulJowed until nfter juchc-
ment. l:Jlnghunt Coal & Lumlu~r Co. v. 
n(lorcl or Educntion or Jorclun School 
J>i~t. ot Sult t,nko County, 61 U. 14!>. 
211 P. ORI. 
~- RHtlllt'H nr d~t"d('nlfl. 
Where widower oncl executrix both 
dnimed ccrtnin moneys on deposit in 
h:rnk und Rlipulatccl that such money 
11houlil remain in hank nt four per coM 
int~rci1l until outcotne of litig-11tion to 
clctcrminc rirlhts lo 11uch tnoney, ex• 
c-cutri:< WRR not entitled to ndditioni,1 
four pt"r c<"!nl on juJ$l'tnent from time it 
wu~ rc.-n,1t)r1•d to time rPmittitur wa~ fih•«I 
nflt'r npp11ul by widowttr. Evnncnvich v. 
Schill~r. tm U. 1, 26 P.2d 8:10. 
5. Amendment or JudA"mfnf. 
Jurhrm~nt re-vised to induclc int<.•rcxt 
nt fftututory r11te wher~ supreme court 
h,111! inadvr.rtcnlly omittt"d it from itf! 
opinion. Ke-lier Y. Chourno11, 96 U. 31, 
70 P.2d ~o. 
l>KiMlonR from other JuriKdiclions. 
- lo~·o. 
In an uclinn in equity, inwreat mlly be 
diRcretionnrily allowed thou.Rh not 
clainmt in pleadings. John11on v, 
Roherts, 220 Iowa 118.(, 206 N. W. 35A. 
M-0-5. Usury-Taking ExceSt1ive Interest a Misdemeanor. 
No per~ou shall, directly or indirectly, tltke or receive in .~erviccR, 
money or other property, any greater Mum or- greater VRluc ror the lonn 
or forbearance of any money, goodN o"r things In action thnn i:1 J>rc-
HCribed in section 44-0-2. An~· per!-ton violating any of the provhdon=-' 
of this Nection i~ guilty of a mi~demeanor. (C. L. 17, § 3322.) 
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15-1-2 CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
Law of 'the forum as governing tho right 
to and rate of interest as damages for do: 
lay in _payment of money or discJ,iargo of 
other obligations, 78 ·A. L. R. 1047. 
Rate of interest aftor maturity on con-
tract n·aming rato but -not employing torm 
"until paid," or similar phrase, 75 A. L. R. 
399. 
Rate of interest· aftor ·maturity on con-
tracts fixing rate "until payment," · 6 A. L . 
R. 1196. 
Rate · of interest after maturity -on obli-
gation which fixes rate of interest ex-
pressly until maturity, 16 A. L. R. 2d 902. 
Statutes in relation to interost as ob-
noxious to constitutional provision:· against· 
impairing obligation of contracts;' 87 A:.., 
L. R. 462. 
. Validity· and effect of anticipatory pro-
vision in contract in relation· to rate ·of 
interest in· event of default, 12 A. L. R. 
367·. . 
15-1-2. Maximum rates.-'fhe parties to any contract may agree in 
writing fo_r the payment of interest for the loan or forbearance of any · 
money, goods or things in action, not to exceed, except as otherwise pro-
v-ide'd by law, ten per ·cent per annum; provided, that on loans of money 
only, to the. amount·_ of $100 or less, it may b_e agreed in writing to take 
or receive as interest on such loan not to exceed-$1 for the first month only 
of such loan, · but thereafter no greater interest shall be contracted for, 
taken or received than .is allowed in this section. · This proviso shall not be 
construed to allow· or permit th·e splitting up of transactions for the loan:· 
of money into small amounts for the purpose of · evading the provisions 
o·f thi·s chapter. 
No contract for the · purchase of any goods, wares or merchandise or 
loan or forbearan_ce of money, shall contain any; provision providi]?.g for. 
a · handling or service charge on any said contract, or any commercial 
charge on said contract, , or any charge whatsoever, which when taken 
together with the interest charged on said co_ntract for the sale of goods, 
wares : or merchandi$e, or for the loan or forbearance of money, excee:ds. 
ten :per cent per· annum of the unpaid principal sum of said loan or 
contract, exceJ?t; (a) a c_ontract may specifically provide for a service 
charge, which charge shall not exceed four per cent per annum of the 
·unpaid· balance of the said principal sum, such service charge to be applied 
but once on. any_ transaction and shall,:not be again applied in case of 
refunding or renewal · of contract between the parties concerned with the 
original transactio_n nor shall such service char ge be subject to any addi-
tional . service charge, interest charge or penalty; (b) a reasonable at-
torney's fee in case of eollection by an attorney; and ( c) such exceptions 
as are otherwise provided by law. 
Interest accruing on· loans, contracts, forbearance· of money, goo'ds, or 
things in action, under- sections 15-1-1 and 15~1-2; when pa:id in advance 
or otherwise shall not exceed the rate of ten per cent per annum. 
Hist ory: L. 1907, cb. 46, § 2; c. L . 1907, 
§ 1241:x:; C. _J;,. 19171 § 3321; R. S. 1933, 
44-0-2; L. 1935, cb. 42, § 1; 0 . 1943, 44-0-2. 
Oompilei:'s Not;~s. 
'l'he 1935 . 'li:mondment reduced tho rate 
specified iri the first sentence· from 12 per 
cont to 10 per cont, and added tho last 
twQ. paragraphs. . . 
The,, roferen·co af tho on:d of the first 
paragraph to" "this chapter" appeared in 
tho act as "this title." The refcronco in 
tho last paragraph to "sections 15-1·1 and 
15-1•2" appearod in th~ act as "a~e~iona 
44-0-1 and 44-0-2, Revised Statutos of 
Utah, 1933." 
Tho presont section boars little simi: 
larity to· its predecessors, except th~t it 
has .alwayl! boon provided t ho.t thero ·may. 
be a· conventional rate. R. S. 1898, § 1241. 
(now repealed); Comp. Laws 1907, § 124lx. 
Effective Dato. 
Section,.2 of Laws 1935, ch. 42 provided 





















15-1-3 CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
Oollatoml Roferenccs. 
Interest€=>29. 
4 7 C.J.S. Interest § 32 . 
Rate of interest, 30 Am. Jur. 25, In-
terest § 31 ct seq. 
Retrospective application and effect of 
statutory provision for interest or changed 
mtc of interest, 4 A. L. R. 2d 932. 
Law Reviews. 
Usury in California, by William Tris-
tam Coffin, 16 Cal. Law Review 281, 387. 
Usury, by Raymond B. McConlogue, 1 
So. Cal. Law Review 263. 
16-1-3. Calculated by the yea.r.- Whenever in any statute or deed, or 
v,:ritten or verbal contract, 01' in any public or private instrunient whatever, 
any certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is stated, • 
interest shall be calculated at the rate mentioned by the year. 
History: L . 1907; ch. 46, § 7; 0. L. 1907, Construction of contractual prov1s1ons 
§ 124lx6; 0. L. 1917, § 3326; R. S. 1933 & as to interest as regards time trom which 




47 C.J.S. Interest § 42 . 
Time at which interest is payable under 
will or contract providing for payment of 
interest, 10 A. L. R. 097. 
16-1-4. Interest on judgments.- A.ny judgment rendered on a lawful 
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by 
the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall 
bear interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum. 
History: L . 1907, ch, 46, § 11; 0 . L. 1907, 
§ 124J.x9; O. L. 1917, § 3330; R. S. 1933 & 
o. 1943, 44-0-4. 
Compiler's Note. . 
Tho first part of this section is almost 
identical ,vith R. S. 1898, § 1241; and this 
section is exactly identical with Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 124lx9. 
Comparable Provision. 
Iowa Code ,1950, § 535.3 (5 cents on 100 
by the year, unless different rate is fixed' 
'by contract on which judgment or decree 
is rendered, in which case interest is ac-
cording to contract but not exceeding 7 
cents on 100 by the year). 
Cross-Reference. 
Interest to be included in judgment 
entry, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
54(e). 
1. Const ruction and operation generally. 
It is only to personal judgments that 
this section applies. Sidney Stevens Im-
plement Co. v. South Ogden Land, Bldg. 
& Improvement Co., 20 U. 267, 58 I>. 848. 
This section provides that judgment, 
which is not upon obligation where rate 
of interest is fixed, shall bear interest at 
rate of 8 per cont per annum. McFarlane 
v. Winters, 114 U. 502, 201 P. 2d 494. 
Utah Code doc& not prevent inclusion 
of interest due as part of principal of 
judgment to be rendered. McFarlane v. 
Winters, 114 U. 5021 201 P. 2d 404, constru-
ing this section. 
2. Allowa.11ce of interest before judg-
ment. 
The true test to be applied as to whether 
or not inter.est shonld be allowed, before 
judgment in given case, is not whether 
damages nre unliquidated or otherwise, 
but whether injury and consequent dam-
ages are complete and must be ascertained 
as of particular time and in accordance 
with fixed rules of evidence. Fell v . Union 
Pac. Ry. Co., 32 U. 101,· 88 P. 1003, 28 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 13 Ann. Cas. 1137. 
3. Interest on damages. 
Award of ~nterest at legal rate on dam-
ages suffered by reason of broach of build· 
ing contract from time they were suffered, 
held pr,oper ns against contention that 
siuco damages were unliquidated, no 
interest could b~ allowed until after judg-
mon\. l?ingham Coal & Lumber Co. v. 
Board 'of Education of Jordun School 
Dist., 61 U. 149, 211 P. 981. 
4. Estates of decedents. 
Where widower and executrix both 
claimed certain moneys on deposit in 
bank and stipulated that such money 
should·. remain in bank at four per cent 
interest until outcome of litigation to 
determine rights to such money, executrix 
was not entitled to additional four per 



















CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
Chapter 
15-1. Interest. 
15-2. Legai ~apacity of children. 
15-3. Interparty agreements . 
15-4. · Joint obligations. 
Section 
15-1-1. Legal rate. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTEREST 
• 15-1-1. Legal ute. The legal rate of interest'f6r the loan or forbearance 
money, goods or things in action shall be SHf f}el' eeftt 10% per annum. But n 
herein contained shall _be so construed _as to in any way affect any penalty or i 
est charge which by law applies 'to delinquent o.r .,other taxes or to any con 
or obligations made before the 14th day of May,~ 1981. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907, 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. I 
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; L. 73, § 1. 
15-1-4. Interesi on judg_ments. Any judgment rendered on a lawful co' 
shall conform thereto and. shall pear the interest agreed upon by the parti 
shall be spe,cified in the judgment;, other judgments shall bear interest at the 
of eight ftei' eeM 12% per annum. · · 
History: L. 1907, .ch . . 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, 
§ 1241X9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2. 
Lato payment of prope rty division in 
divorce action. 
This section does not prohibit a district 
court from imposing an interest rate of more 
than eight percent for late payment o' 
ordered paid in a property division 
divorce action where the property d' 
award is reasonable and equit;ab,\e. ~ 
Pope (1978)"589 P 2d 752. · ' · ·, 
\ 
CHAPTER 2 
LEGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN 
Sect ion 
15-2-1. Period of minority. 
262 19 
1985 






















judgment against owner bee 
f ·1 f . ause f a1 ur~ to urn1sh a bond to O ol'/ 
mater1alman, materialman Protect. · 
P . d . was ent·· ,, t re!u gment interest from the ,!\lect' 
notice to the owner for dem d date cif r· 
d f an of 1 an not rom t he due date i d" Payll\e 
invoice, where at time t he~ 1~ate~ on 1~~ ,-
credit was being extended to t~/ Wfls due' · 
by the material man for a Ire d contracl(i' 
debts. Triple I Supply, Inc. v \Y Past-d/ 
Inc. (1982) 652 P 2d 1298. . Unset naile 
TITLE 15 
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
\, 
.'•·@hapter 




Substantia l performance. • 
D~ctrine of substantial perfor ' 
appl!cabl,e __ t o this bond/ng statut~-ance is 
heatmg subcontract was sulis"ta t" 1• Where p leted on December 23 1968 f n ia ly colJt. 
! · ~5-1. Interest. . .. : i\9-Z. Legal capacity of children. 
5_6_ Prompt Paymen_t Act._ . 






• . · . • , act th t 
mmor item, a register represenr·· · a one 
percent of the value of the su· b• 1?g .Qo113gs 
t f . h contrac• no urms ed until February · 19 1 . .., wa., 
no~ extend the limitation period f~~g _d?es 
action on bond. Carlisle v. Cox (1973) 29f
1hng 
136, 506-P 2d 60. . U 2d 
)tect mechanics and materialmen, etc, 





This section provides no authori~ · 
~ward at~orney fees to the prevailin y to 
m an action between owners. and su~eiarty 
a performance bond not required b Y ~n 
chapter. Lignell v. Berg (1979) 593 p 2d ~~~is 






15.1.1. Interest rates - Legal rate - Contr acted rate. 
15.J.4. Interest on judgments. 
"15•1·1. Interest .rates - Legal rate - Contracted rate. ill Except when par-
ti~s to a lawful contract agree on !!. specified rate Qf interest, the legal rate of inter-
~ffcir-th.e loan or forbearance .of any money, goods, or (thlngs] chose in action 
shall be 10% per annum. [~-1Wtlti-ng !let'etfl eentained shall] Nothing in this sec-
tion~ be [se] construed [ftS] to in any way affect any penalty or interest charge 
wiifch by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations 
made before [the 14th dey ef] May 14, 1981. {g! The parties to 2. lawful contract may agree upon .!!!!_Y rate 2f interest for 
the loan QI forbearance Qf .!!!!.Y money, goods, QI chose in action. · 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907, Compiler's Notes. 
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933; 44-0-1; L. · The 1981 amendment increased the rate in 
1935, ch. 42, § l; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, ch. the first sentence from 6% to 10%; and 
73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6. changed the date at the end of the last sen-
t ence from 1907 to 1981. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which 
shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, 
§1241X9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73," § 2. 
Compiler's-Notes • 
The 1981 amendment increased · the inter-
est rate from 8% to 12%. 
Late payment of property divislon in 
divorce action. . 
· This section does not prohibit a district 
court from imposi ng a n interest rate of more 
than eight percent for late payment of cash 
o·rdered paid in a property division in a 
dJvorce action where the property division 
award is reasonable and equitable. Pope v. 
P.ope (1978) 589 P 2d 752. 
P r ejudgment inte rest. 
Prejudgment in terest is inappropriate as 
to awards for mental anguish and punitive 
damages. First Secur ity Bank of Utah v. 

















CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GE~RA.L 
Chapter 
l. Interest. 
7. Registered Public Obligations Act. 
8. Utah Rental Purchase Agreement Act. 
9 . . U_nifonn Athl,ete Agents Act. 
10. Service Contracts Act. 
Section 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTEREST 
15-1-1. Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal rate . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
• I 
Prejudgment interest. 
Fire protection district· was liable for 10% 
prejudgment interest on invalid lump-sum ser-
vice fees the district collected because J.h,e fees 
were contractual in nature. Highlands at Jor-
dnnelle, LLC v. Wasatch Cnty., 2015 ·U'.l' A'.pp 
173, 790 Utah Adv. 24, 2015 Utah App. L~S 
177 (Utah Ct. App. 2015). . . 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments . 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "l!'ederal postjudgment interest rate" means the interest rate estab-
lished for the federal court system under 28 U.s.c·. Sec. 1961, as amended. 
(b) "Final judgment'' means the judgment rendered when all avenues of 
appeal have been exhausted. , 
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a judgment rendered on· a 
lawful contract shall conform to the con.tract and shall bear the interest 
agreed upon by the parties, which shail b~ specified in th~ judgment. ' . 
·(b) A judgment rendered on a deferred deposit loan subject to Title 7, 
Chapter 23, Check Cashing and Deferred Deposit Lending Registration.Act, 
shall bear interest.at the rate imposed under Subsection·(3) on an amount 
not exceeding the sum ·of: · 
(i) the total of the principal balance of the deferred deposit loan;:,, 
(ii) interest,at the rate imposed by the deferred deposit loan agreement 
for a period not exceeding 10 weeks as provided in Subsection 7-23-401(4); 
(iii) costs; · 
(iv) attorney fees; and 
(v) other amounts allowed by law and ordered by the court. · 
(3)(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, all other final civil and criminal 
judgments of the district court and justice court shall bear interest at the 
federal postjudgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%. 
· (b) Except as otherwise provided by law or contract, all ·final judgments 
97 23 
15-7-4 CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 15-7-4 
under $10,000 in actions regar<;ling·the.,pi.rrchase of goods and services shall 
bear interest at the federaj. ,pcist ju<;lginent_ interest rate as Qf January 1 of 
each year, plus :10%: ·' ,- · 
(c) The postjudgment interest rate in effect at the time of the judgment 
shall remain the interest rate for the duration of the judgment. 
(d) The interest on criminal judgments shall be calculated.-on ,tiie .total 
amount of the judgment. · ' · · 
(e) Interest paid on state revenue shall be deposited in accordance with 
Section 63A-3-505. ···· · · 
(f) Interest paid on revenue to-ii CQUllty or municipality shall be paid to 
the general. fund of the county or··muni~ipality. . 
HISTORY: 
L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, § 1241x9; 
CL 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-4; 
L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2; 1993, ch. 198, § 1; 1999, 
ch. 279, § 1; 2000; ch. 149, § 1; 2005, ch. 190, 
§ 1; 2008, ch. 96, § 17.; 20JQ, ~l\• 10g; § .4; 2911, 
ch. 79, § 1; L. 2014, ch. 281, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. -
The 2014 amendment, effective May 13, 
2014, added (l)(b) and (3)(b); substitutedr"all 
other final civil" for "other civil" in (3Xa); ai'i°d 
made related changes. 
.~, I : ) . : 
.i . . I. ··, . • ·. 
NOTES T9 DECISIONS 
I • • • • 
f.F.!lju~gm.en_t interest. .., :. . , 
· i!i.~kruptcy c9urt did qot _ep--.in Jnt;erpreting 
earlier suite court judgment, . whJch. specifitld 
interest at 10%, to include prejudgment inter-
est because the state court complaint contained 
I • ' : • ,•f ; ; -;, .... \\; 
a clear date. on which . the-alleged ,b~~ac;lf oc-
curred. and the ii mount of loss co~ld,,b!! c!Jlci,i-
lated with al:!!urncy. Wardl\)y v. W14"dJey.OoIJ?., 
No .. 2:12-CV-1075 TS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
80463 (D. Ut~ June 5, 2013). . '. .. _ 
CHAPTER7 
·: _ rtEGisTEREb ·PUBL1c· oBLIGATldNs Acrr· 
, ·,, ; ,• • : . , 1 I • , !° • , ' ' '. ' ' ' • , ' , , .,• I \ , : , 
Section 
15-7-4 . . Registration system establisheq by issuer. 
. ·-: ; . :. . ,; .... 
• I,: . i-5~7,4:,'iRe·gisiration· system establi1?hed by issue1:. 
:· '. ' • : : I .. I,., : _  . ' .. . . . . . . . ~ 
(:l,)(a) Each issue.:r: :is ~ul)qorjzed .to , establish an:d· ll).aintain a system of 
. i:egistr.ation. wit~ .respect tt.O ,ead:i._qbligatio:a it i /:is.u.es. ·. 
· . (b) The system,desccibed in ,this Subse.ction (1.) may either,be: .-. 
(i) a system pursuant to which only certificated; registered,., ,public 
obligations are issued;, ·, · : . · , , 
·1-, .• -(ii) ·a ·system pursuant to .which ,.only uncertific'ated registered public 
obligations a:i:e-issued;cor- ·.:•· ,. , ,. 
(iii) a system pursuant to which both certificated and uncertificated 
registered public obligations are issued. 
(c) The,issuex,may amend,, discontinue, and 'reinstitute a system estab-
lished u.nder this section;-from.tirhe to time, subjectJ to :covenants. : · ,·., ., 
· (2). The system. sha,Iil be established, amended, discmntinued, or reinstitute_d, 
for the is5iuer-by, ,and shall be. maintained for the •issuer as provided by,,r-the 
official or ,official ,body. , .... ,, · .· 
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